All Illnesses Are (Not) Created Equal: Reforming Federal Mental Health Insurance Law by Tovino, Stacey A.
University of Nevada, Las Vegas -- William S. Boyd School of Law
Scholarly Commons @ UNLV Law
Scholarly Works Faculty Scholarship
1-1-2012
All Illnesses Are (Not) Created Equal: Reforming
Federal Mental Health Insurance Law
Stacey A. Tovino
University of Nevada, Las Vegas -- William S. Boyd School of Law
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholars.law.unlv.edu/facpub
Part of the Health Law Commons, Insurance Law Commons, Medical Jurisprudence Commons,
and the Psychology and Psychiatry Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Scholarly Commons @ UNLV Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Scholarly Works by an authorized administrator of Scholarly Commons @ UNLV Law. For more information, please contact
david.mcclure@unlv.edu.
Recommended Citation
Tovino, Stacey A., "All Illnesses Are (Not) Created Equal: Reforming Federal Mental Health Insurance Law" (2012). Scholarly Works.
Paper 688.
http://scholars.law.unlv.edu/facpub/688
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLL\49-1\HLL101.txt unknown Seq: 1 11-JAN-12 9:23
ARTICLE
ALL ILLNESSES ARE (NOT) CREATED EQUAL:
REFORMING FEDERAL MENTAL
HEALTH INSURANCE LAW
STACEY A. TOVINO*
This Article is the second, and most important, installment in a three-part
series that presents a comprehensive challenge to lingering legal distinctions
between physical and mental illness. The basic impetus for this historical, medi-
cal, and legal project is a belief that there exists no rational or consistent
method of distinguishing physical and mental illness in the context of health
insurance law. The first installment in this series narrowly inquired as to
whether a particular set of disorders, the postpartum mood disorders, are or
should be classified as physical or mental illnesses in a range of health law
contexts.1 This second installment is broader in scope and challenges the less
comprehensive public and private health insurance benefits that are available to
individuals who have illnesses traditionally classified as mental. In so doing, this
Article proposes a reform of federal mental health insurance law. The third and
final piece in the series undertakes a necessary correction of state mental health
parity law.2 Throughout this three-part project, the aim is to bring greater atten-
tion to the origins and evolution of the concept of health and to discredit the
notion that individuals with mental health conditions are less deserving of legal
protection and benefits than individuals with physical health conditions. The
purpose of this particular piece is to explore in greater detail the reasons offered
by legislators, regulators, judges, insurers, and other stakeholders for providing
less comprehensive insurance benefits for individuals with mental illness, and to
question the logic, scientific bases, and empirical accuracy of these reasons. In
the end, this Article argues that federal health insurance law should not continue
to discriminate against individuals with mental illness without adequate justifi-
cation. Finding none, this Article proposes a reform of federal mental health
insurance law.
* Professor of Law, William S. Boyd School of Law, University of Nevada, Las Vegas.
B.A., Tulane University, 1994; J.D., University of Houston Law Center, 1997; Ph.D., Univer-
sity of Texas Medical Branch, 2006. I thank John Valery White, (Dean, William S. Boyd
School of Law), for his financial support of this research project. I also thank Jeanne Price
(Director, Wiener-Rogers Law Library), Chad Schatzle (Reference Librarian, Wiener-Rogers
Law Library), and Michael Vargas (former student at Boyd School of Law) for their outstand-
ing assistance in locating many of the medical, scientific, and other sources referenced in this
Article. I further thank the participants of the following symposia and meetings for their help-
ful comments and suggestions on earlier drafts of this Article: The 26th Annual Whittier
Health Law Symposium of Whittier Law School; The 63rd Annual Meeting of the Southeast-
ern Association for Law Schools; and The 33rd Annual Health Law Professors Conference
sponsored by the American Society for Law, Medicine & Ethics.
1 See Stacey A. Tovino, Scientific Understandings of Postpartum Illness: Improving Health
Law and Policy?, 33 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 99 (2010) [hereinafter Tovino, Scientific
Understandings].
2 See Stacey A. Tovino, Reforming State Mental Health Parity Law, HOUS. J. HEALTH L. &
POL’Y (forthcoming 2011) [hereinafter Tovino, Reforming].
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I. INTRODUCTION
Public health care programs and private health insurers have long pro-
vided less comprehensive insurance benefits to individuals with mental ill-
ness. This Article proposes to reform federal health insurance law by
removing statutory and regulatory provisions that allow for unequal physical
and mental health insurance benefits. Part II of this Article begins by analyz-
ing the justifications provided by public health care programs and private
health insurers for providing inferior insurance benefits for individuals with
mental illness, including allegations that mental health care is more costly
and less efficacious than physical health care. These reasons are not sup-
ported in the relevant clinical, economic, and social literatures. The current
health plan cost literature shows that untreated mental illness is associated
with increases in total health care costs, while treatment of mental illness is
associated with decreases in total health care costs. The current mental
health economics literature shows that managed behavioral health care sig-
nificantly reduces if not eliminates the problem of moral hazard in the con-
text of mental health care. Recent studies of cost data obtained from health
care delivery settings in which mental health parity has been implemented
show that mental health parity implementation has not increased total health
care delivery costs.
In Part III, this Article addresses other implications of mental health
benefit disparities that often go unconsidered by policymakers. Recent stud-
ies of the relationship between untreated mental illness and other variables,
including employment, disability, homelessness, welfare, and crime, show
that individuals with untreated mental illness have not only higher total
health care costs but also lower rates of work productivity, higher rates of
disability, higher rates of homelessness, higher rates of welfare, and higher
rates of criminal activity, suggesting significant employer and public pro-
gram returns on initial mental health treatment investments. In addition,
mental health benefit disparities have proven unmanageable in the context of
health insurance coverage litigation. Despite judicial attempts to distinguish
physical and mental illnesses based on a number of different tests that in-
quire into the area of specialization of the treating health care provider, the
nature and type of treatment, the origin of the illness, and the symptoms of
the illness, none of these tests provides a rational or consistent method of
distinguishing physical and mental illness.3
3 Outside the context of mental health insurance law (including in the contexts of disabil-
ity discrimination law, civil rights and human rights law, health information confidentiality
law, health care reform law, and child and adult health and welfare law) individuals with
mental illness are not subject to inferior legal protections or benefits. See Stacey A. Tovino,
Further Support for Mental Health Parity Law and Mandatory Mental Health and Substance
Use Disorder Benefits, 22 ANNALS HEALTH L. (forthcoming 2012). Moreover, the interna-
tional, national, state, and professional definitions of “health” that are used in a range of
clinical, legal, and social contexts uniformly fail to subordinate mental health to physical
health and that these definitions identify both physical wellness and mental wellness as equal
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In Part IV, this Article examines the incomplete development of federal
mental health parity law beginning with President Clinton’s Mental Health
Parity Act of 1996,4 continuing with President George W. Bush’s Paul Well-
stone and Pete Domenici Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act of
2008,5 and concluding with President Obama’s Affordable Care Act of
2010.6 The final part of this Article proposes the extension of federal mental
health parity law and mandatory mental health and substance use disorder
benefits to all individuals with public and private health insurance who do
not currently benefit from such legislation.
A. Inferior Insurance Benefits for Individuals with Mental Illness
Public health care programs and private health insurers have long pro-
vided less comprehensive insurance benefits to individuals with mental ill-
ness in both the inpatient7 and outpatient8 settings.9 The Medicare program, a
public health care program funded and administered by the United States
government, provides health insurance for individuals who are sixty-five
contributors to overall health. Id. The remaining legal distinctions between physical and
mental illness may emanate from the centuries-old mind-body problem, which continues to
animate health law, philosophy of the mind, and other legal and philosophical doctrine. Id.
Finally, the stigma associated with mental illness may be serving as a formidable obstacle to
mental health parity even when all other obstacles have been removed. Id.
4 Mental Health Parity Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-204, secs. 701–03, 110 Stat. 2944
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1185a (2006 & Supp. IV 2010) and 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-26
(2006 & Supp. IV 2010)) [hereinafter MHPA]. See generally infra Part IV.A.
5 Paul Wellstone and Pete Domenici Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act of
2008, in Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, secs. 511–12,
122 Stat. 3765, 3881–93 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1185a (2006 & Supp. IV 2010)
and 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-26 (2006 & Supp. IV 2010)) [hereinafter MHPAEA]. See generally
infra Part IV.B.
6 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010),
as amended by Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat.
1029 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of U.S.C.) [hereinafter ACA]. See
generally infra Part IV.C.
7 An inpatient may be defined as a patient who: (1) receives room, board and professional
services in a medical institution for a twenty-four-hour period or longer; or (2) is expected by
the institution to receive room, board and professional services in the institution for a twenty-
four-hour period or longer even though it later develops that the patient dies, is discharged, or
is transferred to another facility and does not actually stay in the institution for twenty-four
hours. See 42 C.F.R. § 440.2(a) (2010).
8 An outpatient may be defined as a patient of an organized medical facility, or distinct
part of that facility, who is expected by the facility to receive and who does receive profes-
sional services for less than a twenty-four-hour period regardless of the hour of admission,
whether a bed is used, and whether the patient remains in the facility past midnight. See id.
9 See, e.g., DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL HEALTH
SERVS. ADMIN., MENTAL HEALTH: A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL 418 (1999) [herein-
after SURGEON GENERAL REPORT]  (“Private health insurance is generally more restrictive in
coverage of mental illness than in coverage for somatic illness.”; “Federal public financing
mechanisms, such as Medicare and Medicaid, also imposed limitations on coverage . . . of
‘nervous and mental disease . . .’”); Colleen L. Barry, The Political Evolution of Mental Health
Parity, 14 HARV. REV. PSYCHIATRY 185, 186 (2006) [hereinafter Barry, Political Evolution]
(“Ever since the inception of third-party payment for mental health services, coverage has
been substantially more limited than insurance for general medical care.”).
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years of age or older, individuals under the age of sixty-five who have cer-
tain disabilities, and individuals with end-stage renal disease regardless of
age.10 Both Medicare Part A, which provides hospital insurance benefits,11
and Medicare Part B, which provides physician and other supplementary
medical insurance benefits,12 provide less comprehensive insurance benefits
for beneficiaries with mental illness.
Medicare Part A restricts beneficiaries to a lifetime maximum of 190
inpatient days in a freestanding psychiatric hospital but places no lifetime
maximum on the number of days a beneficiary may stay as an inpatient in a
non-psychiatric hospital.13 The federal government justifies the 190-day lim-
itation as a cost-control measure.14 Some Medicare beneficiaries with severe
chronic mental illnesses, including chronic schizophrenia and affective dis-
orders, would easily exceed 190 inpatient days over their lifetime without
the limitation.15 With the limitation, affected beneficiaries are limited to: (1)
Medicare-covered outpatient mental health care, which may be insufficiently
intense to treat an acute illness episode and may result in suicide or other
poor outcomes; (2) Medicare-covered inpatient care provided in a non-psy-
chiatric setting by clinicians who may lack the education, training, and expe-
rience necessary to treat complex psychiatric conditions; or (3) non-covered
inpatient care provided in a psychiatric setting for which the beneficiary
must pay entirely out of pocket.16 Some beneficiaries who consider unsatis-
factory the options of outpatient mental health care or inpatient care in a
10 See 42 U.S.C. § 1395c (2006). See generally Dep’t Health & Human Servs., Ctrs. Medi-
care & Medicaid Servs., What Is Medicare? CMS PUB. NO. 11306 (Apr. 2008).
11 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395c–1395i-5 (2006 & Supp. IV 2010) (establishing “[Medicare]
Part A—Hospital Insurance Benefits for Aged and Disabled”).
12 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395j–1395w-4 (2006 & Supp. IV 2010) (establishing “[Medicare]
Part B—Supplementary Medical Insurance Benefits for Aged and Disabled”).
13 See 42 C.F.R. § 409.62 (2010); see also NAT’L POL’Y FORUM, MEDICARE’S MENTAL
HEALTH BENEFITS 1 (Feb., 2007); CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, CBO STAFF MEMORANDUM: THE
INPATIENT PSYCHIATRIC HOSPITAL BENEFIT UNDER MEDICARE 4–5 (July 1993) [hereinafter
CBO MEMORANDUM].
14 See Judith R. Lave & Howard H. Goldman, Medicare Financing for Mental Health
Care, HEALTH AFF. Feb. 1990, at 19, 21 (“This limit assures that Medicare will not pay for the
long-term custodial support of the mentally ill.”); NAT’L POL’Y FORUM, supra note 13 (explain- R
ing that Medicare Part A’s 190-day lifetime maximum on mental health care provided in a
freestanding psychiatric hospital was intended to limit the federal government’s mental health
care costs).
15 See, e.g., Letter from Michael J. Fitzpatrick, Exec. Dir., Nat’l Alliance on Mental Ill-
ness, to Rep. Paul Tonko (D-N.Y.) (Sept. 20, 2010), available at http://www.nami.org/Tem-
plate.cfm?Section=Issue_Spotlights&template=/ContentManagement/ContentDisplay.cfm&
ContentID=107512 (explaining that many nonelderly Medicare beneficiaries with disabilities
have already exceeded the 190-day limit or are at imminent risk of doing so).
16 CBO MEMORANDUM, supra note 13, at 13 (noting that once a Medicare beneficiary R
reaches the 190-day limitation, the beneficiary may turn for care to a general hospital (where
the limit does not apply) or to outpatient care, or may forgo psychiatric care entirely); CBO
MEMORANDUM, supra note 13, at 10 (“[T]he alternative provider might be less capable of R
providing the most appropriate care if psychiatric hospitals have specialized in treating certain
kinds of patients—for example, those who need acute care for severe or complex condi-
tions.”); CAL. HEALTH ADVOCATES, SUMMARY OF MEDICARE BENEFITS AND COST SHARING
FOR 2011 (2010), available at http://www.cahealthadvocates.org/basics/benefits-summary.
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non-psychiatric setting may forgo mental health care entirely if they are una-
ble to pay 100% of the costs of inpatient care provided in a psychiatric
setting.17
In addition to the Medicare Part A limitation on inpatient care provided
in a freestanding psychiatric hospital, Medicare Part B also provides less
comprehensive outpatient mental health benefits than non-mental health
benefits. In particular, Medicare Part B currently imposes a 45% beneficiary
coinsurance18 on most outpatient mental health services, including individ-
ual, family, and group psychotherapy services, instead of the 20% benefici-
ary coinsurance traditionally applied to non-mental health outpatient
services.19 Although Medicare will phase out the disparate coinsurances by
the year 2014, Medicare beneficiaries who receive outpatient mental health
services between the present and 2014, will be required to pay out of their
own pockets 15–35% more of the cost of those services than of non-mental
health services.20
The Medicaid Program, a public health care program jointly funded by
the federal and state governments and administered by the states, provides
health care to certain low-income individuals and families who fit into an
eligibility group recognized by federal and state law.21 Like the Medicare
Program, the Medicaid Program also has limited support for individuals who
html (explaining that Medicare beneficiaries pay out of pocket for 100% of the costs of inpa-
tient services provided in a psychiatric setting after 190 days).
17 CBO MEMORANDUM, supra note 13, at 13 (“[E]nrollees who consider alternative R
sources of covered care to be unsatisfactory substitutes may forgo care entirely, either because
they are unable to pay for psychiatric hospital care themselves or because they choose not to
do so.”).
18 Although no health insurance-related federal statute or regulation defines “coinsur-
ance,” it may be defined as the insured’s liability after the insurer has paid its portion of the
total health care costs. See DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CTRS. MEDICARE & MEDICAID
SERVS., MEDIGAP COVERAGE OF OUTPATIENT MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES THAT ARE SUBJECT
TO THE MENTAL HEALTH PAYMENT REDUCTION 6 n.ix (Dec. 2002) (defining coinsurance with-
out reference to a statute or regulation and with respect to common parlance, that is, the bene-
ficiary’s liability after Medicare payment is made).
19 See 42 U.S.C. § 1395l(c) (2006 & Supp. IV 2010) (calculating as Medicare incurred
expenses only 62.5% of the outpatient expenses associated with the treatment of mental, psy-
choneurotic, and personality disorders). Until 2010, Medicare was thus responsible for only
50% (i.e., 62.5% x 80% (80% is the Medicare approved amount)) of the cost of most outpa-
tient mental health services, and the Medicare beneficiary was responsible for the remaining
50%. In 2008, President George W. Bush signed into law the Medicare Improvements for
Patients and Providers Act of 2008, section 102 of which increased Medicare’s portion of
incurred expenses for outpatient mental health services to 68.75% in 2010 and 2011 (resulting
in a 45% beneficiary coinsurance), 75% in 2012 (resulting in a 40% beneficiary coinsurance),
81.25% in 2013 (resulting in a 35% beneficiary coinsurance), and 100% in 2014 and thereafter
(resulting in a 20% coinsurance). By 2014, Medicare thus will pay 80% of (and Medicare
beneficiaries will pay a 20% coinsurance on) all outpatient mental health services. Medicare
Improvements for Patients and Providers Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-275, § 102, 122 Stat.
2494, 2498 (entitled, “Elimination of Discriminatory Copayment Rates for Medicare Outpa-
tient Psychiatric Services”).
20 See 42 U.S.C. § 1395l(c) (2006 & Supp. IV 2010).
21 See, e.g., Schweiker v. Gray Panthers, 453 U.S. 34, 36–37 (1981) (“An individual is
entitled to Medicaid if he fulfills the criteria established by the State in which he lives.”);
DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CTRS. MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., MEDICAID PRO-
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLL\49-1\HLL101.txt unknown Seq: 6 11-JAN-12 9:23
6 Harvard Journal on Legislation [Vol. 49
require mental health care in certain inpatient psychiatric settings. For exam-
ple, Medicaid does not cover inpatient mental health care provided to indi-
viduals age twenty-two through sixty-four in an institution for mental
disease (“IMD”),22 defined as a hospital, nursing facility, or other institution
of more than sixteen beds that is primarily engaged in providing diagnosis,
treatment, or care of persons with mental disease.23 Medicaid also does not
cover mental health care provided in small residential facilities, including
halfway houses, adult residential foster homes, and crisis centers.24 Due to
these limitations, many Medicaid beneficiaries are limited to: (1) Medicaid-
covered outpatient mental health care, which may be insufficiently intense to
treat an acute illness episode and may result in suicide or other poor out-
comes; (2) Medicaid-covered inpatient care provided in a facility other than
an IMD or a small residential facility by clinicians who may lack the educa-
tion, training, and experience necessary to treat complex psychiatric condi-
tions; or (3) non-covered inpatient care provided in an IMD or small
residential facility for which the beneficiary must pay entirely out of pocket.
Because Medicaid eligibility generally requires evidence of low income,25
most Medicaid beneficiaries will not be able to pay 100% of the cost of
treatment in an IMD or small residential facility.26
Private health insurers also have a long history of providing less com-
prehensive insurance benefits to individuals with mental illness.27 Tradition-
ally, many private insurers did not cover mental illness.28 Notwithstanding
GRAM—GENERAL INFORMATION, http://www.cms.gov/medicaidgeninfo/01_overview.asp? (last
updated Jun. 16, 2011) [hereinafter MEDICAID PROGRAM].
22 See 42 C.F.R. § 435.1009(a)(2) (2006) (prohibiting Medicaid coverage of health care
services provided to individuals under age sixty-five who are patients in an institution for
mental disease).
23 See 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(i) (2006 & Supp. IV 2010) (defining institution for mental
disease).
24 See, e.g., Carl A. Taube, Howard H. Goldman & David Salkever, Medicaid Coverage
for Mental Illness: Balancing Access and Costs, HEALTH AFF., Feb. 1990, at 5, 8 (1990).
25 See, e.g., MEDICAID PROGRAM, supra note 21. R
26 Costs of inpatient care provided in a psychiatric setting can exceed $1,000 per day in a
public facility and $2,000 per day in a private facility. See, e.g., Meg Kissinger, Mental Facil-
ity’s Size Cost Taxpayers Millions, MILWAUKEE WISCONSIN J. SENTINEL, Nov. 13, 2010 (stat-
ing that the cost of inpatient care at Milwaukee County Mental Health Complex, a public
psychiatric hospital located in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, is $1,082 per day); $58,752 for 18 Days
of Involuntary Commitment to Mental Hospital, BIPOLAR: CRAZY MERMAID’S BLOG (Aug. 14,
2010), http://crazymer1.wordpress.com/2010/08/14/58752-for-18-days-of-involuntary-com-
mittment-to-mental-hospital/ (stating that the cost of inpatient care at Fairfax Hospital, a pri-
vate psychiatric hospital located in Kirkland, Washington, is between $2,468 and $3,900 per
day).
27 See, e.g., Colleen L. Barry et al., Design of Mental Health Benefits: Still Unequal After
All These Years, HEALTH AFF., Sept. 2003, at 127, 127 [hereinafter Barry et al., Still Unequal]
(presenting health insurance data from a national employer survey; finding that, even after the
implementation of the Mental Health Parity Act of 1996, private employer-sponsored mental
health insurance coverage is less comprehensive than non-mental health insurance coverage).
28 SURGEON GENERAL REPORT, supra note 9, at 418 (“Some private insurers refused to R
cover mental illness treatment.”).
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the efforts of mental health parity advocates,29 neither the federal Mental
Health Parity Act of 1996 (“MHPA”)30 nor the Paul Wellstone and Pete
Domenici Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act of 2008
(“MHPAEA”)31 required private insurers to offer insurance benefits for
mental illness.32 Before President Obama signed the health care reform bill
into law and unless otherwise prohibited by state law, private health insurers
were permitted to sell individual policies and group health insurance that
contained benefits for illnesses traditionally classified as physical, such as
cancer and pregnancy, but that did not contain benefits for illnesses tradi-
tionally classified as mental, including major depression and bipolar disor-
der.33 Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010
(“PPACA”) as reconciled by the Health Care and Education Reconciliation
Act (as consolidated, the Affordable Care Act (“ACA”)), mental health and
substance use disorder benefits must be part of the essential benefit package
offered in the exchange-offered qualified health plan setting,34 the non-ex-
change individual health plan setting, the non-exchange small group health
plan setting, the Medicaid state plan setting, and the Medicaid benchmark
29 Mental health parity advocates support the financing of mental health care on the same
basis as the financing of physical health care. See, e.g., SURGEON GENERAL REPORT, supra
note 9, at 426 (describing the concept of mental health parity and explaining that “[t]he funda- R
mental motivation behind parity legislation is the desire to cover mental illness on the same
basis as somatic illness, that is, to cover mental illness fairly”). See generally Dana L. Kaplan,
Can Legislation Alone Solve America’s Mental Health Dilemma? Current State Legislative
Schemes Cannot Achieve Mental Health Parity, 8 QUINNIPIAC HEALTH L.J. 325, 328 (2005)
(describing the mental health parity movement).
30 MHPA, Pub. L. No. 104-204, secs. 701–03, 110 Stat. 2944 (1996) (codified as amended
at 29 U.S.C. § 1185a (2006 & Supp. IV 2010) and 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-26 (2006 & Supp. IV
2010)).
31 MHPAEA, Pub. L. No. 110-343, Subtitle B, secs. 511–12, 122 Stat. 3756, 3881 (2008)
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1185a (2006 & Supp. IV 2010) and 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-26
(2006 & Supp. IV 2010)).
32 See 29 U.S.C. § 1185a(b)(1) (2006 & Supp. IV 2010)  (“Nothing in this section shall be
construed as requiring a group health plan (or health insurance coverage offered in connection
with such a plan) to provide any mental health benefits”); 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-26(b)(1) (2006
& Supp. IV 2010).
33 See 29 U.S.C. § 1185a(b)(1) (2006 & Supp. IV 2010); 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-26(b)(1)
(2006 & Supp. IV 2010). Some states do require individual and group health plans to include
mental health benefits in their health plans. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 27-54-4(a)(1)–(8) (2010)
(requiring all group health plans to include insurance benefits for a range of mental illnesses,
including schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, panic disorder, obsessive-compulsive disorder, ma-
jor depressive disorder, anxiety disorders, and mood disorders); HAW. REV. STAT. § 431M-2
(2010) (requiring all individual and group health plans to include insurance benefits for mental
illness as well as alcohol and drug dependency).
34 A health insurance exchange is a competitive insurance marketplace where individuals
and small businesses can purchase affordable and qualified health benefit plans beginning on
or after January 1, 2014. See Provisions of the Affordable Care Act, by Year, HEALTH-
CARE.GOV, http://www.healthcare.gov/law/timeline/full.html (last visited Nov. 3, 2011). Ex-
change-offered health plans must contain certain “essential health benefits,” defined to include
mental health and substance use disorder benefits, by the same date. See Essential Health
Benefits, HEALTHCARE.GOV, http://www.healthcare.gov/glossary/e/essential.html (last visited
Nov. 3, 2011).
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and benchmark-equivalent plan setting.35 However, as discussed in more de-
tail in Part IV.C, below, the essential health benefits requirement does not
apply in the grandfathered health plan setting, the non-exchange large group
health plan setting, and the self-insured group health plan setting.36 Even
after health care reform, then, millions of insureds still do not have a federal
legal right to mandatory mental health and substance use disorder benefits.37
Prior to health care reform, some health plans voluntarily included in-
surance benefits for mental illness; however, many of these plans imposed
higher cost-sharing requirements and greater administrative restrictions on
mental health coverage, including higher deductibles, copayments, and coin-
surance amounts for mental health care,38 as well as lower inpatient day and
outpatient visit limitations and annual and lifetime spending caps for mental
health care.39 Although MHPAEA requires parity between physical health
benefits and mental health benefits in terms of deductibles, copayments, co-
insurance, inpatient day limitations, and outpatient visit limitations,40 as dis-
cussed below in Part IV.B, it only regulates large group health plans, not
small group health plans.41 MHPAEA also does not apply to individual
health insurance policies sold in the private market, the Medicare Program,
Medicaid non-managed care plans, or any self-funded non-federal govern-
mental group plan whose sponsor has opted out of MHPAEA.42 Before ACA
and unless otherwise prohibited by state law, many public health care pro-
grams and private health plans thus were permitted to contain disparate
mental health benefits.43 Although ACA broadened the application of
35 See infra notes 270–274 and accompanying text. R
36 See infra notes 275–285 and accompanying text. R
37 See infra notes 275–285 and accompanying text. R
38 See supra notes 19–20 and accompanying text. On the other hand, many health mainte- R
nance organizations provide 100% insurance (that is, they require no coinsurance) for preven-
tive care or routine care that is provided on an in-network basis. See, e.g., Working to Keep You
Well, HEALTH PLAN OF NEVADA, BENEFITS (2010), available at http://www.healthplanofne-
vada.com/documents/working%20to%20keep%20you%20well.pdf (requiring no coinsurance
for Tier I health care services).
39 See, e.g., SURGEON GENERAL REPORT, supra note 9, at 426–27 (summarizing typical R
mental health benefit disparities that existed in 1997: “[T]he most common insurance restric-
tion was an annual limit on inpatient days . . . ”); Barry, Political Evolution, supra note 9, at R
186 (“In 1982, 31% of full-time employees with mental health benefits in medium and large
private firms were subject to separate inpatient day limits, and 19% had separate outpatient
visit limits. By 2002, 77% had separate inpatient day limits, and 75% had separate outpatient
visit limits.”); Kaplan, supra note 29, at 329 (summarizing mental health benefit disparities R
that existed in the context of employer-sponsored health plans in 1988); Keith Nelson, Legisla-
tive and Judicial Solutions for Mental Health Parity: S. 543, Reasonable Accommodation, and
an Individualized Remedy Under Title I of the ADA, 51 AM. U. L. REV. 91, 93, 99 (2001)
(discussing typical private plan limitations on mental health insurance benefits).
40 See infra notes 252–257 and accompanying text. R
41 See infra notes 245–246 and accompanying text. R
42 See infra note 246 and accompanying text. R
43 Some states do require small group health plans and individual health insurance policies
to establish parity between physical and mental health benefits in terms of deductibles, copay-
ments, coinsurance, inpatient day limitations, and outpatient visit limitations. See, e.g., 24 ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2325-A(5-C)(B)(1) (2010) (requiring health insurance policies is-
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MHPA, as expanded by MHPAEA, from just the large group health plan
setting to the exchange-offered qualified health plan setting and the Medi-
caid benchmark and benchmark-equivalent plan setting,44 some small group
health plans continue to be exempt from MHPA, as expanded by MHPAEA
and ACA (collectively, “federal mental health parity law”). The Medicare
Program and traditional fee-for-service Medicaid also continue to be exempt
from federal mental health parity law, as are self-funded, non-federal gov-
ernmental plans whose sponsors have opted out of federal mental health par-
ity law.45 Even after the full implementation of health care reform, then,
most public health care program beneficiaries and some individuals with
private health insurance still do not have a federal legal right to equal physi-
cal health and mental health insurance benefits.46
II. UNEQUAL BENEFITS: REASONS AND RESPONSES
Public health care programs and private insurers offer a number of dif-
ferent justifications for their disparate physical and mental health insurance
benefits. The reason given most frequently is that mandatory mental health
and substance use disorder benefits and mental health parity will cause in-
surers’ costs to rise.47 As background, health insurers frequently focus on the
sued in Maine to provide insurance benefits for the diagnosis and treatment of mental illness
under terms and conditions that are no less extensive than the benefits provided for treatment
of physical illness); id. § 2325-A(5-C)(B)(4) (prohibiting health insurance policies issued in
Maine from containing separate maximums for physical and mental illness, separate deduct-
ibles and coinsurance amounts for physical illness and mental illness, separate out-of-pocket
limits for physical illness and mental illness, or separate office visit limits for physical illness
and mental illness); MD. CODE INS. § 15-802(c) (2010) (requiring individual and group health
insurance policies issued in Maryland to provide benefits for the diagnosis and treatment of
mental illness under the same terms and conditions that apply under the policy or contract for
the diagnosis and treatment of physical illness).
44 See infra note 264 and accompanying text. R
45 See infra notes 231–232 and accompanying text. R
46 See infra notes 231–232 and accompanying text. R
47 See, e.g., Parity of Medicare Benefits for Persons with Mental and Substance Use Con-
ditions: Before the H. Subcomm. on Health of the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 110th Cong.
2 (2007) (statement of Eric Goplerud, Ph.D., Research Professor, Dep’t of Health Pol’y, George
Washington Univ. Med. Ctr.) [hereinafter Goplerud Statement] (“There was a concern (per-
haps justifiable) that equitable coverage would lead to overuse and uncontrolled costs.”); SUR-
GEON GENERAL REPORT, supra note 9, at 418 (“[Private i]nsurers feared that coverage of R
mental health services would result in high costs associated with long-term and intensive psy-
chotherapy and extended hospital stays . . . . These factors encouraged private insurers to limit
coverage for mental health services.”); Barry, Political Evolution, supra note 9, at 186–87 R
(identifying a general perception among policymakers in the late 1970s and the early 1980s
that broad coverage for mental health was expensive and unpredictable); id. at 189 (“Cost has
always been a salient feature of the political debate over benefit regulation.”); Allan Beigel &
Steven S. Sharfstein, Mental Health Care Providers: Not the Only Cause or Only Cure for
Rising Costs, 141 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 668, 668 (1984) (“During the past 25 years . . . [c]osts
have risen, resulting in resistance to financing treatment of mental illness on both the public
and private sectors.”); Richard G. Frank, Will Parity in Coverage Result in Better Mental
Health Care?, 345 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1701, 1701 (2001) (“Potential costs are one reason
insurers treat mental health services differently.”); Kaplan, supra note 29, at 337 (“Opponents R
of mental health parity . . . cite studies and reports that demonstrate that mental health parity
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problems of moral hazard and adverse selection when justifying mental
health benefit disparities.48 In the context of mental health care, moral hazard
refers to the concern that individuals who do not pay for 100% of the cost of
their own mental health care will use more mental health services because
they do not value these services at their full cost.49 To control moral hazard
in the context of mental health care, insurers traditionally have imposed
lower inpatient day and outpatient visit maximums, as well as higher deduct-
ibles, copayments, and coinsurance amounts, on mental health care.50 Not-
withstanding insurers’ concerns regarding moral hazard in the context of
mental health care, many of which may be linked to the three-decades-old
RAND Health Insurance Experiment,51 recent studies demonstrate that the
demand for mental health services is less price elastic than the demand for
physical health services and that the current demand for mental health ser-
vices is less price elastic than the demand for mental health services was
will result in a significant increase in the cost of employee insurance coverage.”); Nelson,
supra note 39, at 106. R
48 See, e.g., Interim Final Rules Under the Paul Wellstone and Pete Domenici Mental
Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act of 2008, 75 Fed. Reg. 5410, 5424 (Feb. 2, 2010) (“A
frequent justification for higher cost-sharing of mental health and substance use disorder bene-
fits is the greater extent of moral hazard for these benefits; individuals will utilize more mental
health and substance use disorder benefits at a higher rate when they are not personally re-
quired to pay the cost.”); SURGEON GENERAL REPORT, supra note 9, at 420 (discussing the R
concepts of moral hazard and adverse selection in the context of mental health insurance);
Frank et al., supra note 47, at 1701–02. R
49 See, e.g., SURGEON GENERAL REPORT, supra note 9, at 420 (discussing the concept of R
moral hazard in the context of mental health care); see also Richard G. Frank & Thomas G.
McGuire, Parity for Mental Health and Substance Abuse Care Under Managed Care, 1 J.
MENTAL HEALTH POL’Y ECON. 153, 155 (1998) [hereinafter Frank & McGuire, Parity].
50 See SURGEON GENERAL REPORT, supra note 9, at 420; see also Barry et al., Still Une- R
qual, supra note 27, at 130 (“Health plans have historically attempted to control costs by R
requiring that enrollees pay more at the point of service for mental health care compared with
other medical services.”); supra notes 38–39 and accompanying text. R
51 In 1971, the former federal Department of Health, Education, and Welfare began fund-
ing the RAND Health Insurance Experiment (“HIE”), a multi-year, multi-million dollar exper-
imental study of health care costs, utilization, and outcomes. The HIE, frequently referred to as
the largest health policy study in United States history, reported that patient cost sharing
reduces “inappropriate” or “unnecessary” medical care as well as “appropriate or needed”
medical care. See DEP’T HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE, RAND HEALTH INSURANCE EXPERIMENT
(1982); RAND CORPORATION, THE HEALTH INSURANCE EXPERIMENT (2006) (summarizing the
HIE’s principal questions and findings). The study’s applicability to today’s managed-care
dominated health care delivery market has recently been challenged:
[M]any have cited the RAND Health Insurance Experiment . . . which demonstrated
that individuals are more likely to increase their mental health care usage when their
personal cost-sharing for mental health care services fall than they are to increase
their physical health care usage when their personal cost-sharing for physical health
care services decreases. Because this experiment was conducted nearly thirty years
ago, researchers recently tested to determine whether this result held true. Their re-
sults indicate that individuals’ sensitivity to changes in cost-sharing may have
changed significantly over time . . . .
Interim Final Rules Under the Paul Wellstone and Pete Domenici Mental Health Parity and
Addiction Equity Act of 2008, 75 Fed. Reg. 5410, 5424 (Feb. 2, 2010).
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twenty-five to thirty years ago.52 Recent studies also suggest that deductibles
(in both the traditional indemnity53 and managed care54 settings) and coinsur-
ance amounts (in the managed care setting) have no impact and very little
impact, respectively, on the demand for mental health care.55 Additional
studies that analyze the impact of managed health care and behavioral health
carve-out plans56 on demand for mental health care suggest that the imple-
mentation of managed behavioral health care undermines the assumed de-
mand response as an efficiency argument against parity.57 As a result,
economists now suggest that the imposition of higher deductibles, copay-
ments, and coinsurance amounts on mental health care may no longer be
justified on efficiency grounds and that the traditional practice of unequal
health insurance benefit sets may need to be revisited.58
Insurers also are concerned with adverse selection; that is, the concern
that in a health care market with voluntary insurance or multiple insurers,
plans that offer generous mental health benefits will attract individuals with
greater mental health care needs, leading to higher service usage and costs
52 See, e.g., Chad D. Meyerhoefer & Samuel Zuvekas, New Estimates of the Demand for
Physical and Mental Health Treatment, 19 J. HEALTH ECON. 297, 297 (2010) (“Results from
our correlated random effects specification indicate that the price responsiveness of ambula-
tory mental health treatment has decreased substantially and is now slightly lower than physi-
cal health treatment”; concluding, “[t]his suggests that concerns over moral hazard alone do
not warrant less generous coverage for mental health.”).
53 In a traditional indemnity health plan, patients are free to select their primary care prov-
iders, specialty care providers, and hospital and other institutional care providers. However,
indemnity plan patients usually are subject to relatively high deductibles (e.g., $1,000–4,000)
and coinsurance amounts (e.g., 20–25%).
54 In a managed care plan, enrollees usually are assigned to a primary care provider who
must preauthorize access to a specialty health care provider. Managed care plan enrollees
typically pay a small co-payment (e.g., $10, $15, or $25) for each visit to a primary care or
specialty care provider instead of a high deductible combined with coinsurance. Coverage is
usually limited to a small class of providers in a particular service area, unless the enrollee has
an emergency medical condition. In the typical managed care plan, health care is rationed and
health care costs are controlled by managers, not by high cost-sharing amounts imposed on
enrollees. See, e.g., Leonard S. Goldstein, Genuine Managed Care in Psychiatry: A Proposed
Practice Model, 11 GEN. HOSP. PSYCHIATRY 271, 271 (1989) (referencing several definitions
of managed care; offering one definition of “genuine managed care”; that is, the attempt to
improve, where possible, the system of care; and characterizing other definitions of managed
care by their attempts to lower the cost of medical care through benefit barriers, access barri-
ers, treatment restrictions, case management, and other interventions).
55 See, e.g., Chunling Lu et al., Demand Response of Mental Health Services to Cost
Sharing Under Managed Care, 11 J. MENTAL HEALTH POL’Y & ECON. 113 (2008) [hereinaf-
ter, Lu et al., Demand Response].
56 See infra notes 147–149 and accompanying text for a discussion of behavioral health R
carve-out plans.
57 See, e.g., Frank & McGuire, Parity, supra note 49, at 153 (“Because costs are con- R
trolled by management under managed care and not primarily by out of pocket prices paid by
consumers, demand response recedes as an efficiency argument against parity.”); Ching-to
Albert Ma & Thomas C. McGuire, Costs and Incentives in a Behavioral Health Carve-Out,
HEALTH AFF., Mar. 1998, at 53, 56–64 (reporting studies in Massachusetts Medicaid and other
contexts showing an association between behavioral health carve-outs and significant savings
(e.g., 25–60%) per enrollee due to the virtual elimination of inpatient treatment).
58 See Meyerhoefer & Zuvekas, supra note 52, at 24. R
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for those insurers.59 Historically, many insurers have not offered mental
health benefits as a way of controlling adverse selection.60 Of course, the two
pre-conditions to adverse selection (voluntary insurance and multiple insur-
ers) were at the heart of the U.S. health care reform debate.61 Although Con-
gress elected not to proceed with a single-payer system, President Obama’s
health care reform bill requires all individuals to maintain minimum essen-
tial health insurance coverage62 and requires exchange-offered qualified
health plans, non-exchange individual health plans, non-exchange small
health plans, Medicaid state plans, Medicaid benchmark plans, and bench-
mark-equivalent plans to include mental health and substance use disorder
benefits in their essential health benefit packages.63 If upheld,64 these health
care reform provisions will lessen insurers’ risks relating to adverse selection
beginning in the year 2014, when the requirements become effective.65
Perceived moral hazard and adverse selection concerns may continue to
exist post-health care reform because the reform bill does not require certain
categories of health plans to include mental health and substance use disor-
der benefits.66 Health insurers that are exempt from mandatory mental health
59 See, e.g., SURGEON GENERAL REPORT, supra note 9, at 420 (discussing adverse selection R
in the context of mental health care); Frank & McGuire, Parity, supra note 49, at 156. R
60 SURGEON GENERAL REPORT, supra note 9, at 420; see also Barry et al., Still Unequal, R
supra note 27, at 134 (discussing adverse selection in the context of mental health care; ex- R
plaining that, “adverse-selection incentives could play a role in explaining the endurance of
benefit limits. While the advent of managed care has attenuated fears that coverage expansions
would exacerbate cost control problems, benefit restrictions could be motivated by a health
plan’s desire to avoid enrollees with a propensity to avail themselves of mental health care.”).
61 See, e.g., David Brooks & Gail Collins, What’s Wrong with a Single-Payer System?,
N.Y. TIMES OPINIONATOR (July 29, 2009, 4:29 PM), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/
2009/07/29/whats-wrong-with-a-single-payer-system; Karen Davenport et al., Should Health
Insurance Be Mandatory?, N.Y. TIMES ROOM FOR DEBATE (June 4, 2009, 7:43 PM),
http://roomfordebate.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/06/04/should-health-insurance-be-mandatory/
(five-author debate examining the merits of mandatory health insurance).
62 See ACA, Pub. L. No. 111-148, sec. 1501(b), § 5000A(a), 124 Stat. 119 (2010), as
amended by Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 (2010) (“An applicable individual shall for
each month beginning after 2013 ensure that the individual, and any dependent of the individ-
ual who is an applicable individual, is covered under minimum essential coverage for such
month.”).
63 See infra notes 270–274 and accompanying text. R
64 The health care reform bill has been declared unconstitutional by both federal district
courts and federal circuit courts of appeal. See, e.g., Florida ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dep’t of
Health & Human Servs., 780 F. Supp. 2d 1256 (N.D. Fla.), order clarified, 780 F. Supp. 2d
1307 (N.D. Fla.), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Florida ex rel. Att’y Gen. v. U.S. Dep’t of
Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235 (11th Cir. 2011), cert. granted (U.S. Nov. 14, 2011)
(Nos. 11-393, 11-398, 11-400).
65 See, e.g., Frank et al., supra note 47, at 1702 (“Parity can improve the efficiency of R
insurance markets by eliminating wasteful forms of competition that are the result of adverse
selection. Mandating a particular level of mental health care establishes a floor for
coverage.”).
66 See infra notes 231–232, 275–285 and accompanying text; see also BERNADETTE FER- R
NANDEZ, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41069, SELF-INSURED HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE 5
(May 12, 2010) (“[G]roup health plan or health insurance coverage . . . in which a person was
enrolled on the date of enactment [of PPACA] is grandfathered and exempt from most insur-
ance reforms.”).
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and substance use disorder benefits and federal mental health parity law may
continue to impose mental health benefit restrictions in an attempt to control
perceived moral hazard and adverse selection concerns without recognizing
the negative clinical and related cost implications of their benefit restrictions
and without taking into account the role of managed care in minimizing
moral hazard and other efficiency concerns.67
First, although mental health benefit restrictions may reduce inappropri-
ate or unnecessary mental health care, mental health benefit restrictions also
have been shown to reduce appropriate outpatient and inpatient mental
health care.68 Consider an individual who is a member of a health plan to
which mental health parity law does not apply and who is being treated on
an outpatient basis with counseling, pharmacotherapy, and rehabilitation ser-
vices for a severe and persistent mental illness, such as schizoaffective disor-
der.69 When the individual reaches her annual outpatient visit maximum,
perhaps after four or five months, she may discontinue her outpatient care if
she cannot afford to pay 100% of the cost of such care out of her own
pocket.70 Shortly thereafter, the individual may become floridly psychotic
and require admission to an inpatient psychiatric unit.71 Thirty or sixty days
later, when the individual reaches her annual inpatient day maximum, she
may be discharged from the inpatient hospital unit, but shortly thereafter
may present to the most expensive setting for health care delivery—the
67 See, e.g., Goplerud Statement, supra note 47, at 9 (discussing several economic, social, R
and other implications of untreated mental illness); Interim Final Rules Under the Paul Well-
stone and Pete Domenici Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act of 2008, 75 Fed. Reg.
5410, 5423–24 (Feb. 2, 2010) (discussing several economic implications of mental health ben-
efit restrictions and recognizing that the moral hazard problem can be controlled through man-
aged behavioral health care); SURGEON GENERAL REPORT, supra note 9, at 420 (discussing the R
clinical implications of mental health benefit restrictions).
68 See, e.g., SURGEON GENERAL REPORT, supra note 9, at 457 (“Financial obstacles dis- R
courage people from seeking treatment and from staying in treatment. Repeated surveys have
shown that concerns about the cost of care are among the foremost reasons why people do not
seek care.”). Even the RAND study, which insurers have cited in support of the moral hazard
theory, found that cost sharing reduces the use of effective health care. See RAND CORPORA-
TION, supra note 51, at 4. R
69 See, e.g., Interim Final Rules Under the Paul Wellstone and Pete Domenici Mental
Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act of 2008, 75 Fed. Reg. 5410, 5422 (Feb. 2, 2010)
(explaining that severe and persistent mental illnesses, including schizophrenia, bipolar disor-
der, and chronic major depression require prolonged, and sometimes lifetime, maintenance
treatment that consists of pharmacotherapy, supportive counseling, and often rehabilitation
services).
70 See, e.g., id.
The most common visit limits under current insurance arrangements are those for 20
visits per year. That means assuming a minimal approach to treatment of one visit
per week, people with severe and persistent mental disorders will exhaust their cov-
erage in about five months. This often results in people foregoing outpatient treat-
ment and a higher likelihood of non-adherence to treatment regimes that produce
poor outcomes and the potential for increased hospitalization costs.
Id.
71 See id.
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emergency room—following a suicide attempt.72 Individuals with mental
health insurance benefit disparities are not discouraged from presenting (and
ambulances are not discouraged from transporting patients) to the emer-
gency room following a suicide attempt or other psychiatric emergency be-
cause federal law requires all Medicare-participating hospitals with an
emergency department to provide any individual who requests examination
or treatment an appropriate medical screening examination and, if the indi-
vidual is determined to have an emergency medical or psychiatric condition,
necessary stabilizing treatment or an appropriate transfer to another medical
facility, regardless of the individual’s ability to pay.73 In summary, outpatient
mental health benefit restrictions can increase more costly inpatient mental
health care usage, and inpatient mental health benefit restrictions can in-
crease costly emergency room usage.74
Although the scenario described above is a hypothetical, it is drawn
from the current clinical and economic literatures. As described in more de-
tail below, a number of studies show that mental health benefit restrictions
are associated with a lack of access to mental health care and untreated
mental illness.75 Studies also show that untreated mental illness can increase
total health care costs over and above the cost of treating the mental illness,
perhaps because individuals who have a mental illness are more likely to
have a physical illness76 and because untreated mental illness can worsen the
72 See id. (explaining that implementation of mental health parity potentially could reduce
emergency room use by ensuring that benefits for individuals with serious mental illness are
not terminated); Leah Carlson Shepherd, More Patients Heading to the Emergency Room,
EMP. BENEFITS NEWS, Oct. 1, 2008, http://ebn.benefitnews.com/news/more-patients-heading-
emergency-room-711231-1.html (quoting Paul Fronstin, Director of the Health Research and
Education Program at the Employee Benefit Research Institute as stating, “The ER is the most
expensive setting for people to get care.”).
73 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395dd(a), 1395dd(b)(1) (2006); 42 C.F.R. § 489.24(b)(1) (2010) (de-
fining “emergency medical condition” to include “a medical condition manifesting itself by
acute symptoms of sufficient severity (including . . . psychiatric disturbances and/or symptoms
of substance abuse) . . .”).
74 See, e.g., Goplerud Statement, supra note 47, at 9 (discussing a Minnesota study finding R
that the state’s elimination of its outpatient substance abuse insurance benefit limitations re-
sulted in a decrease in inpatient hospital and emergency room usage by individuals with sub-
stance abuse conditions); Interim Final Rules Under the Paul Wellstone and Pete Domenici
Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act of 2008, 75 Fed. Reg. 5410, 5422 (Feb. 2,
2010) (explaining that parity in a world dominated by managed behavioral carve-outs has
resulted in reduced rates of hospitalization and fewer very long episodes of outpatient care);
Saul Feldman et al., Mental Health Parity: A Review of Research and a Bibliography, 29
ADMIN. & POL’Y MENTAL HEALTH 215, 216 (2002) (“Several studies have shown that when
benefit parity is introduced with managed care, a larger percentage of adults and children
access outpatient services. However, the overall number of outpatient visits does not increase,
and inpatient admissions and lengths of stay decrease.”).
75 See, e.g., David R. McKusick et al., Trends in Mental Health Insurance Benefits and
Out-of-Pocket Spending, 5 J. MENTAL HEALTH POL’Y ECON. 71, 71 (2002) (“Insurance benefits
can have a large effect on whether one is able to access health care services. . . . When
insurance covers more limited expenditures, more must be paid out-of-pocket by the insured
and there is less incentive to use services and more financial risk.”).
76 See, e.g., Interim Final Rules Under the Paul Wellstone and Pete Domenici Mental
Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act of 2008, 75 Fed. Reg. 5410, 5423–24 (Feb. 2, 2010)
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prognosis of, prolong the period of recovery from, and increase the risk of
mortality associated with physical illness.77 Finally, a number of studies sug-
gest that treating mental illness can decrease total health care costs.78 Repre-
sentative studies are examined below.
In the early 1990s, researchers affiliated with the Group Health Cooper-
ative of Puget Sound (“GHC”) desired to better understand the burden of
depression on individual patients and society as a whole.79 As background,
the researchers believed that diagnosis and treatment of depression in indi-
viduals could yield a societal return on investment by lowering rates of un-
employment and disability, but the researchers were also aware of the need
to understand and control health care costs as part of any policy recommen-
dation or initiative.80 The researchers thus set out to investigate the relation-
ship between untreated depression and total health care costs in 6,257 GHC
health maintenance organization (“HMO”) members who were eighteen
years of age or older and had a diagnosis of depression made during an
outpatient visit between April 1, 1992, and December 31, 1992.81 Using
computerized visit-diagnosis data, pharmacy records, and cost-accounting
data from GHC, the researchers compared overall health care costs for pri-
mary care patients with recognized depression and overall health care costs
for age- and gender-matched patients without depression.82 The researchers
found that the patients diagnosed with depression had higher annual health
care costs ($4,246 versus $2,371), and 50% to 75% higher costs for every
category of care setting, including the primary care setting, all medical spe-
cialties, the medical inpatient setting, and the pharmacy and laboratory set-
tings.83 The researchers concluded not only that the diagnosis of depression
was associated with a twofold increase in use of health services84 but also
(“Mental health and physical health are interrelated, and individuals with poor mental health
are more likely to have physical health problems as well.”).
77 See, e.g., id. at 5424 (“[T]here is evidence that comorbid depression worsens the prog-
nosis, prolongs recovery and may increase the risk of mortality associated with physical ill-
ness.”); DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL HEALTH SERVS.
ADMIN., DESIGNING EMPLOYER-SPONSORED MENTAL HEALTH BENEFITS, DHHS Pub. No.
SMA-06-4177, 14 (2006) (reporting that depression following surgery for myocardial infarc-
tion is common but if left untreated can nearly double the risk of death eighteen months after
heart surgery).
78 See infra notes 125–144 and accompanying text; see also Interim Final Rules Under the R
Paul Wellstone and Pete Domenici Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act of 2008, 75
Fed. Reg. 5410, 5424 (Feb. 2, 2010) (“Increased access and utilization of mental health and
substance use disorder benefits could result in a reduction of medical/surgical costs for indi-
viduals afflicted with mental health conditions and substance use disorders.”).
79 See Gregory E. Simon et al., Health Care Costs of Primary Care Patients with Recog-
nized Depression, 52 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 850, 850 (1995).
80 See id.
81 See id. at 851.
82 See id. at 852.
83 See id. at 850–52.
84 See id. at 854.
These data demonstrate markedly higher health care costs among HMO patients with
recognized depression . . . . A twofold difference in total cost between those diag-
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that the greater medical utilization exceeded the costs that would be associ-
ated with treating the depression.85 As part of their conclusion, the research-
ers recommended that policy decisions regarding the scope of mental health
insurance benefits take into account the association between depression and
total health care costs.86
In 1997, researchers affiliated with GHC published the results of a sec-
ond study designed “to examine whether depressive symptoms in older
adults contribute to the increased cost of general medical services.”87 The
researchers conducted a four-year (1989–1993) prospective study of 2,558
older-than-sixty-five adults in GHC.88 Through a mail survey and telephone
interviews, the researchers measured each participant’s depressive symptoms
at baseline (1989), at two years (1991), and at four years (1993).89 The re-
searchers then compared each patient’s depressive symptoms to data ob-
tained from GHC’s cost accounting system relating to each patient’s total
health care costs.90 The researchers found that in the cohort of older adults
studied, depressive symptoms were common, persistent, and associated with
a significant increase in the cost of general medical services.91 More specifi-
cally, the researchers found that patients with significant depression at base-
line had higher median costs ($2,147) during the first year after baseline than
patients without depression ($1,461).92 Patients with significant depressive
symptoms at baseline also had higher median costs at year four ($15,423)
than patients without depressive symptoms ($10,152).93 The researchers also
found that the increase in the cost of general medical services associated
with depression was spread over all components of health care.94 During the
year following baseline, for example, patients with depression had a higher
number of inpatient admissions, outpatient visits, laboratory tests, emer-
gency department visits, prescriptions, ancillary visits, and optometry vis-
its.95 The researchers further found that the increase in the cost of general
nosed as having depression and the comparison group was maintained over 12
months of observation, suggesting a chronic component to utilization differences.
Id.
85 See id. at 855 (“In this 9-month sample of HMO primary patients with recognized
depression, depression-related specialty mental health care and antidepressant drugs accounted
for approximately $3.8 million, while greater use of general medical services accounted for
$8.9 million over 1 year.”). See generally Interim Final Rules Under the Paul Wellstone and
Pete Domenici Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act of 2008, 75 Fed. Reg. 5410,
5424 (Feb. 2, 2010) (explaining, for example, that “comorbid depression has been shown to
increase the costs of medical care, over and above the costs of treating the depression itself.”).
86 See Simon et al., supra note 79, at 855. R
87 Ju¨rgen Unu¨tzer et al., Depressive Symptoms and the Cost of Health Services in HMO
Patients Aged 65 Years and Older, 277 JAMA 1618, 1618 (1997).
88 Id. at 1618–19.
89 Id.
90 Id.
91 Id. at 1618.
92 Id.
93 Id. at 1620.
94 Id. at 1618, 1621.
95 Id. at 1620.
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medical services was not accounted for by an increase in specialty mental
health care,96 and that even after adjusting for differences in age, sex, and
severity of chronic medical illness, the increase in health care costs remained
significant.97 The researchers formally concluded that depressive symptoms
in older adults are associated with a significant increase—roughly 50%—in
the total cost of general medical services.98 The researchers also suggested
that mental health insurance benefit disparities might be shortsighted be-
cause they ultimately may increase total health care costs.99
Similar findings have been shown in other health care delivery settings.
In 2009, researchers affiliated with Massachusetts General Hospital and
Massachusetts Institution of Technology published the results of a study de-
signed to better understand the interaction between depression and the cost
of non-mental health care in eleven chronic comorbid diseases.100 To that
end, the researchers examined the insurance claims of 618,780 patients en-
rolled in self-insured, private health care plans based primarily in Texas,
California, and across the eastern seaboard.101 The researchers examined the
insurance records, dating from September 1, 2004, to August 31, 2005, for
total annual non-mental health costs in eleven different disease categories,
including asthma, back pain, congestive heart failure, coronary artery dis-
ease, diabetes, epilepsy, headache, hypertension, intervertebral disc disease,
obesity, and joint pain.102 In each disease cohort, the researchers calculated
median annual non-mental health cost for individuals with and without de-
pression.103 The researchers found that patients with depression had higher
median per-patient annual non-mental health costs than patients without de-
pression in all eleven diseases studied.104 The per-patient difference in non-
mental health costs between non-depressed and depressed patients ranged
96 Id. at 1618, 1621.
97 Id. at 1618, 1620–21.
98 Id. at 1618, 1621.
99 Id. at 1622.
Our findings on the costs of health services are important because by the year 2040,
persons older than 65 years are projected to make up 21% of the population and
consume almost half of the nation’s health care resources. Medicare currently spends
only about 3% of its resources on mental health care and continues to have a 50%
[now 45%] copayment for most outpatient mental health services. These policies
may shift the costs of mental health treatment to primary care, where the lack of
recognition and adequate treatment of depression are well documented and where
depression may manifest itself in higher general medical costs. If depression is in-
deed a significant contributor to total health care costs, such restrictions of access to
mental health services may be shortsighted.
Id.
100 See Charles A. Welch et al., Depression and Costs of Health Care, 50 PSYCHOSOMAT-
ICS 392, 392 (2009).
101 Id. at 393.
102 Id.
103 Id. at 394.
104 Id.
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from $1,570 in obesity to $15,240 in congestive heart failure.105 The ratio of
cost between non-depressed and depressed patients ranged from 1.5 in obes-
ity to 2.9 in epilepsy.106 The researchers also found that the median annual
pharmaceutical costs for the depressed patients were consistently higher than
the pharmaceutical costs for the non-depressed patients, with a difference
ranging from $590 in obesity to $1,410 in epilepsy.107 Finally, the research-
ers found that “each of the 11 chronic comorbid diseases was more preva-
lent in the depressed cohort than in the non-depressed cohort” (with the ratio
of prevalence between non-depressed and depressed patients ranging from
1.4 in coronary artery disease and hypertension to 6.8 in obesity).108
Given this data, the Massachusetts-based researchers formally con-
cluded that, even when controlling for the number of chronic comorbid dis-
eases, depressed patients had significantly higher costs than non-depressed
patients in a magnitude consistent across the eleven chronic comorbid dis-
eases.109 The researchers suggested several potential reasons for their find-
ings, including the possibility that depressed patients engage in self-neglect,
including non-compliance with recommended health care.110 By way of ex-
planation, the researchers noted that other studies have shown that self-neg-
lect in diabetes and heart disease patients is correlated with higher utilization
of emergency room, outpatient, inpatient, and specialty services.111 The re-
searchers also identified as a possible cause the association between depres-
sion and “higher rates of harmful lifestyle factors such as smoking,
overeating, and lack of physical activity,” as well as more severe
pathophysiology across all chronic disease categories.112 Finally, the re-
searchers raised the question, but were unable to answer, whether there may
be metabolic factors associated with depression that exacerbate the
pathophysiology of comorbid diseases.113
Similar depression-to-cost findings also have been demonstrated in the
public health care program setting. In 2009, researchers at the University of
Washington, Columbia University, the National Institute of Mental Health,
105 Id.
106 Id.
107 Id. at 394–95.
108 Id. at 395.
109 Id. Other studies report similar findings. See, e.g., Bruce A. Arnow et al., Relationships
Among Depression, Chronic Pain, Chronic Disabling Pain, and Medical Costs, 60 PSYCHIAT-
RIC SERVS. 344, 344 (2009) (finding that patients with major depressive disorder and comorbid
disabling chronic pain had higher medical service costs than other groups of patients who had
either disabling chronic pain or depression or neither); Leonard E. Egede, Deyi Zheng, & Kit
Simpson, Comorbid Depression is Associated with Increased Health Care Use and Expendi-
tures in Individuals with Diabetes, 25 DIABETES CARE 464, 464 (2002) (finding that “depres-
sion in individuals with diabetes is associated with increased health care use and expenditures,
even after adjusting for differences in age, sex, race, ethnicity, health insurance, and
comorbidity”).
110 Welch et al., supra note 100, at 399. R
111 Id.
112 Id.
113 Id.
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and Green Ribbon Health published their analysis of the health care claims
of 14,902 Medicare beneficiaries who were enrolled in a pilot disease man-
agement program designed to investigate the association between depression
and total health care costs as well as specific components of health care
costs.114 The majority of the Medicare beneficiaries studied had diabetes,
many had congestive heart failure, and approximately 20% had both diabetes
and congestive heart failure.115 The researchers divided the beneficiaries into
three mental health status groups: 2,108 beneficiaries who had been diag-
nosed with depression, 1,081 beneficiaries who had not been officially diag-
nosed with depression but who screened positive when given a questionnaire
or who reported taking antidepressant medication, and 11,713 beneficiaries
who did not have depression.116 The researchers found that the beneficiaries
diagnosed with depression incurred approximately $22,960 in total health
care costs over one year, while those without depression incurred costs of
approximately $11,956 over the same year.117 Medicare beneficiaries with
possible depression based on depression screening or reported antidepressant
use incurred $14,365 in total annual health care costs.118
The researchers found that the beneficiaries with diagnosed depression
spent significantly more in almost all health care cost categories, including
home health care, skilled nursing care, outpatient non-mental health care,
inpatient non-mental health care, physician services, and durable medical
equipment.119 The beneficiaries with diagnosed depression did not, however,
spend more money on specialty mental health care compared to the benefi-
ciaries without depression.120 Total mental health care costs accounted for
less than two percent of total health care costs for the beneficiaries with
depression.121 The researchers formally concluded that among the Medicare
beneficiaries with chronic medical illness whose data was used in the study,
those who also had depression had both significantly higher health care costs
and were not receiving enough mental health care.122 The researchers theo-
rized that the higher Medicare copayments that applied to outpatient mental
health care (50% at the time of the study, now 45%) compared to outpatient
physical health care (20% then and now) posed an obstacle to the receipt of
114 Ju¨rgen Unu¨tzer et al., Healthcare Costs Associated with Depression in Medically Ill
Fee-for-Service Medicare Participants, 57 J. AM. GERIATRIC SOC. 506 (2009) [hereinafter
Unu¨tzer et al., Healthcare Costs].
115 Id. at 507.
116 Id. at 508.
117 Id.
118 Id.
119 Id. at 509.
120 Id.
121 Id. at 508.
122 Id. at 509.
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needed mental health care.123 The researchers suggested in their conclusion
that evidence-based depression care may yield long-term cost savings.124
Given the literature showing an association between untreated mental
illness and health care cost increases, a number of research groups began to
investigate whether treatment of mental illness could produce subsequent
decreases in total health care costs. To that end, researchers affiliated with
GHC published in 2006 the results of a study investigating the association
between depression treatment and health care costs over the subsequent six
months.125 In their research, the study authors analyzed data obtained from
GHC associated with 1,814 patients who met criteria for major depressive
episodes and entered treatment.126 Thirty-four percent of the patients whose
data were analyzed achieved remission from depression, thirty-seven percent
improved but did not meet criteria for remission, and twenty-nine percent
had persistent major depression three to four months later.127 After adjusting
for baseline differences in the severity of each patient’s initial depression and
expected health care costs, the study authors found that mean health services
costs over the six months following acute-phase treatment were $2,012 for
those achieving remission, $2,571 for those improved but not remitted, and
$3,094 for those with persistent major depression.128 The study authors also
found that average costs for depression treatment, including antidepressant
prescriptions, outpatient visits, and mental health inpatient care, ranged from
$429 in the full remission group to $585 in the persistent depression
group.129 The authors formally concluded that remission from depression is
associated with significantly lower subsequent health care services utiliza-
tion and health care costs across the full range of mental health and general
medical services compared with persistent depression.130
Similar findings have been demonstrated in a variety of other health
care delivery contexts. In 2008, for example, researchers published the re-
123 Id. at 510; see also supra note 19 and accompanying text. R
124 See Unu¨tzer et al., Healthcare Costs, supra note 114, at 510. R
125 Gregory E. Simon, Rezaul K. Khandker, Laura Ichikawa & Belinda H. Operskalaski,
Recovery from Depression Predicts Lower Health Services Costs, 67 J. CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY
1226 (2006).
126 Id. at 1226, 1228–29. The patient data analyzed was representative of GHC’s general
patient population, including private employer-enrolled members, Medicare beneficiaries,
Medicaid beneficiaries, and enrollees of the Washington Basic Health Plan, a state-subsidized
program for low-income residents of the State of Washington. Id. at 1227.
127 Id. at 1226, 1228.
128 Id. at 1226.
129 Id.
130 Id. at 1226, 1230; see also id. at 1229.
After adjustment for baseline differences, health services costs were approximately
50% higher for patients with persistent depression than for patients who reached full
remission. This cost difference was spread across all categories of outpatient and
inpatient health services. Comparison of visit and hospitalization rates showed the
same pattern: consistently higher utilization for those with poorer depression
outcomes.
Id.
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sults of a randomized controlled trial, Improving Mood: Promoting Access
to Collaborative Treatment (“IMPACT”), which was designed to investigate
the long-term effects on total health care costs of participation in a depres-
sion treatment program compared with usual primary care.131 Five hundred
and fifty-one participants from two IMPACT trial sites who satisfied clinical
criteria for either depression or dysthymia were randomly assigned to the
IMPACT intervention group or to a usual primary care group.132 The patients
assigned to the IMPACT group had access for one year to a depression care
manager who provided education, behavioral activation, support of an-
tidepressant medication management prescribed by their regularly primary
care provider, and problem-solving treatment in primary care for up to
twelve months.133 The patients assigned to the usual primary care group were
told that they met the criteria for major depression or dysthymia and were
encouraged to follow up with their primary care provider for treatment.134
The researchers obtained from the trial sites cost accounting data that
tracked costs associated with all health care delivered to the patients.135
The study authors found that the patients who were assigned to the IM-
PACT group had lower mean total health care costs ($29,422) over the four-
year period compared to the patients who were assigned to the usual care
group ($32,785), which represented a cost savings among the IMPACT pa-
tients of $3,363 per patient on average during four years.136 The IMPACT
patients had lower health care costs than the usual care patients in every
health care cost category observed, including outpatient mental health costs,
inpatient mental health costs, outpatient medical costs, inpatient medical and
surgical costs, pharmacy costs, and other outpatient costs.137 The researchers
formally concluded that, when compared with usual primary care, the IM-
PACT program is associated with a high probability of lower total health
care costs during a four-year period.138 The researchers also stated that their
findings support the implementation of programs and policies that facilitate
coverage of and reimbursement for treatment of mental illnesses such as
depression and dysthymia.139
131 See Ju¨rgen Unu¨tzer et al., Long-Term Cost Effects of Collaborative Care for Late-Life
Depression, 14 AM. J. MANAGED CARE 95 (2008).
132 Id. at 95–96.
133 Id.
134 Id. at 96.
135 Id.
136 Id. at 95, 98.
137 Id. at 98.
138 Id. at 95.
139 Id. at 100. For additional information regarding the IMPACT study and the adoption of
the IMPACT approach by other health care delivery systems due to its cost effectiveness, see
generally Justin Reedy, Team Treatment for Depression Cuts Medical Costs, UW TODAY, Feb.
7, 2008, http://www.washington.edu/news/archive/id/39654. Scientists also have studied the
effect of scaling back mental health spending following a period of mental health spending,
and their findings continue to support mental health parity. See, e.g., Robert A. Rosenheck et
al., Effect of Declining Mental Health Service Use on Employees of a Large Corporation,
HEALTH AFF., Sept. 1999, at 193, 201 (finding that general health care costs and sick days
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The studies described above were conducted in populations of patients
with traditional mental illnesses, such as depression and dysthymia. Re-
searchers also have investigated the relationship between treatment of other
mental illnesses, such as alcohol and drug abuse, and health care costs as
well as a number of other variables, including employment, drug and alcohol
consumption, and criminal activity. These studies show that treating alcohol
and drug abuse can yield significant clinical and economic returns on an
employer’s or public health care program’s initial treatment investment. For
example, a group of researchers published in 2000 the results of a study
conducted in the State of Washington that examined the clinical and eco-
nomic returns on addiction treatment provided to 263 Medicaid-eligible drug
addiction treatment clients.140 The clinical and economic returns were calcu-
lated based on an analysis of several variables (each of which was assigned a
cost), including number of days experiencing medical problems, overnight
hospitalizations for medical treatments, emergency room visits for medical
treatment, clinic or physician visits for medical treatments, days experienc-
ing psychological or emotional problems, days in inpatient psychiatric treat-
ment, days in hospital outpatient psychiatric treatment, income received
from employment, money spent on alcohol, money spent on drugs, and days
engaged in illegal activities.141 The study demonstrated that each dollar in-
vested in full-continuum (“FC”) addiction care (defined as care that begins
with an inpatient hospital or residential stay, is followed by intensive outpa-
tient services, and is followed by outpatient aftercare) and partial-continuum
(“PC”) addiction care (defined as care that begins with intensive outpatient
care and is followed by additional less intensive outpatient care) yielded
returns of approximately 9.7 and 23.3 times their initial investments, respec-
tively.142 The study also demonstrated that the average cost of treatment
amounted to $2,530 for FC addiction care and $1,138 for PC addiction care,
and that the average economic benefit amounted to $20,363 for FC addiction
care and $12,130 for PC addiction care, producing a net economic benefit of
both FC and PC addiction care.143 The study authors formally concluded that
their results strongly suggest that both FC and PC addiction care can gener-
ate positive and significant net benefits to society.144
increased when mental health spending was cut back at one large self-insured company; con-
cluding that, “[p]erhaps the most important implication of this study is that reductions in use
of mental health services can be associated with compensatory increases in use of medical
services and may adversely affect the functional and health status of patients, with no savings
to payers.”).
140 See Michael T. French et al., Benefit-Cost Analysis of Residential and Outpatient Ad-
diction Treatment in the State of Washington, 24 EVALUATION REV. 609, 626 (2000).
141 See id. at 617–18.
142 See id. at 625–26.
143 See id. at 625.
144 See id. at 609, 627 (“It therefore appears that the State of Washington is receiving
value for its treatment investments in both clinical and financial terms—at least to the extent
that these samples are representative of patients entering treatment.”).
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In addition to clinically-oriented studies that use private health plan and
public health care program data to show an association between mental ill-
ness and total health care costs, a second line of research based primarily in
economics suggests that the moral hazard concerns associated with mental
health parity implementation may have been valid decades ago in the tradi-
tional indemnity setting,145 the same efficiency concerns are less valid under
managed health care.146 This is especially true for managed mental health
care provided through a behavioral health carve-out plan, which is a special-
ized managed behavioral health plan that is separate (or carved out) from an
employer’s or group’s regular managed care organization and that has exper-
tise in establishing specialty mental health provider networks, negotiating
mental health provider payment rates, and managing utilization to affect the
cost and supply of mental health services.147 The number of behavioral
health carve-out plans has increased significantly, perhaps due to the carve-
out plans’ documented role in reducing inpatient admissions, lengths of
stays, and total spending on inpatient care.148 In theory, managed behavioral
health carve-out plans eliminate unnecessary utilization at its source and on
a case-by-case basis.149
In one study published in 1998, three researchers tracked access, utili-
zation, and costs of mental health care for a large, private, West Coast-based
employer over nine years (1988–1996) during which managed care was in-
troduced and mental health benefits were substantially expanded and carved
out of the traditional medical plan by a behavioral health carve-out plan
(U.S. Behavioral Health).150 In one of the first long-term reports of the cost
trend under a managed behavioral health carve-out plan, the study authors
reported a 43% lower cost (including the administrative fee charged by U.S.
Behavioral Health) per enrollee per month in 1995 than in 1990, the year
before the carve-out decision.151 The study authors attributed the cost savings
145 See supra note 52 and accompanying text. R
146 See supra notes 53–58 and accompanying text. R
147 See, e.g., Interim Final Rules Under the Paul Wellstone and Pete Domenici Mental
Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act of 2008, 75 Fed. Reg. 5410, 5422 (Feb. 2, 2010)
(“Since the early 1990s, many health insurers and employers have made use of specialized
vendors, known as behavioral health carve-outs, to manage their mental health and substance
abuse benefits. These vendors have specialized expertise in the treatment of mental and addic-
tive disorders and organized specialty networks of providers. These vendors are known as
behavioral health carve-outs. They use information technology, clinical algorithms and selec-
tive contracts to control spending on mental health and substance abuse treatment.”); Barry,
Political Evolution, supra note 9, at 190 (discussing behavioral health carve-out plans); Ma & R
McGuire, supra note 57, at 54. R
148 See, e.g., Barry, Political Evolution, supra note 9, at 190 (noting growth of carve-out R
plans); Frank et al., supra note 47, at 1702 (noting tendency of carve-out plans to reduce R
spending); Ma & McGuire, supra note 57, at 54 (“The rapidly growing use of separate carve- R
out contracts has been stimulated by reports of very favorable cost experience for many pay-
ers, with some savings reported to be in the range of 40 percent or more.”).
149 See, e.g., SURGEON GENERAL REPORT, supra note 9, at 423. R
150 See William Goldman, Joyce McCulloch, & Roland Sturm, Costs and Use of Mental
Health Services Before and After Managed Care, HEALTH AFF., Mar. 1998, at 40, 41.
151 Id. at 45.
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in part to a decline in inpatient admissions and an increased use of outpatient
care.152 According to the study authors, “The main result is that despite
higher initial access to specialty care in the post period and substantially
increased benefits, costs for mental health care declined dramatically in the
first year and continued to decline slowly in the following five years.”153 The
study authors concluded that the implementation of mental health parity in a
managed behavioral health carve-out setting could yield long-run cost con-
tainment and that mental health parity implementation would not “brea[k]
the bank.”154
In a second study published in 1998, two Boston University economists
examined the costs associated with a behavioral health carve-out plan initi-
ated in July 1993 by the Group Insurance Commission (“GIC”) of the Com-
monwealth of Massachusetts.155 The economists obtained data from GIC
eligibility and health claims files dated July 1991 through June 1995, a pe-
riod that included two years of pre-carve-out data and two years of post-
carve-out data.156 The economists found a very significant cost reduction af-
ter the initiation of the carve-out plan.157 In the two years prior to the initia-
tion of the carve-out plan (1992 and 1993), plan costs were $16.93 million
and $14.82 million, respectively.158 In the two years following the initiation
of the carve-out plan (1994 and 1995), plan costs were $9.32 million and
$7.29 million, respectively.159 Average GIC payments per participant per
month also significantly decreased from $13.92 in 1992 and $12.22 in 1993
to $6.04 in 1994 and $4.77 in 1995.160 Overall, the economists found a
50–60% gross reduction in costs and an estimated 30–40% minimum net
reduction in costs after adjusting for a number of different trends, including
a shifting enrollee case-mix, rising medical prices, and a downward drift in
mental health and substance service use.161 The economists formally con-
152 Id. at 46–47.
153 Id. at 48.
154 Id. (“[S]witching to managed care dramatically reduces costs even if benefits are in-
creased. Moreover, this is not just a one-time cost reduction after which the cost spiral restarts;
rather, our data show long-run cost containment.”). For similar conclusions, see also Colleen
L. Barry et al., A Political History of Federal Mental Health and Addiction Insurance Parity,
88(3) MILBANK Q. 404, 414–15 (2010) [hereinafter Barry et al., Political History] (“All the
employer groups we interviewed pointed out that this newer research evidence, together with
their own experiences with benefit expansion under managed care, contributed to the evolution
in their view that comprehensive parity would not break the bank.”); Roland Sturm, Weiying
Zhang & Michael Schoenbaum, How Expensive Are Unlimited Substance Abuse Benefits
under Managed Care? 26(2) J. BEHAV. HEALTH SERVS. & RES. 203, 210 (1999) (“In contrast
to common belief that unlimited SA [(substance abuse)] benefits will break the bank and
therefore are not a realistic policy option, ‘parity’ for SA in employer-sponsored health plans is
affordable under comprehensively managed care.”).
155 See Ma & McGuire, supra note 57, at 54. R
156 See id. at 62.
157 See id. at 63.
158 See id.
159 See id.
160 See id.
161 See id. at 64–65.
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cluded that “by any standard, the data show a very significant cost reduction
after the carve-out.”162
In a third study published in 2008, three researchers from Harvard Uni-
versity investigated the demand response of mental health services to cost-
sharing under managed health care and compared it to the demand response
of mental health services to cost-sharing under traditional indemnity (fee-
for-service) plans.163 More specifically, the researchers obtained data from
the 1996 Medical Expenditure Panel Survey and analyzed the effect of
prices on the probability of ambulatory mental health uses.164 The research-
ers found that the effect of the coinsurance rate on ambulatory mental health
services demand under managed care plans was significantly smaller than
that under indemnity plans and was not significantly different than zero.165
The researchers formally concluded that managed care, not out-of-pocket
prices paid by consumers, controls rates of utilization.166 The researchers
also stated in their conclusion that efficiency arguments against mental
health parity may not apply to managed care settings.167
In addition to research demonstrating that the moral hazard concerns
associated with mental health parity may not apply in the managed care set-
ting, a final line of research examining the actual costs associated with the
implementation of mental health parity in particular health care delivery set-
tings shows that mental health parity implementation has not increased total
health care delivery costs. One such setting is the Federal Employees Health
Benefits (“FEHB”) Program, the largest employer-sponsored health insur-
ance program in the United States that serves more than eight million federal
employees, annuitants, and dependents.168 In January 2001, the FEHB Pro-
gram instituted a mental health and substance abuse parity policy in compli-
162 See id. at 63. For similar findings, see also Richard G. Frank & Thomas G. McGuire,
Savings from a Medicaid Carve-Out for Mental Health and Substance Abuse Services in Mas-
sachusetts, 48 PSYCHIATRIC SERVS. 1147, 1152 (1997) (“The carve-out program for mental
health and substance abuse care in Medicaid in Massachusetts produced substantial savings for
the state. Early estimates of savings on the order of 25 percent were essentially maintained
throughout the life of the contract, figuring projected expenditures on the basis of medical
price inflation.”).
163 See Lu et al., Demand Response, supra note 55, at 113. R
164 Id. at 114.
165 Id. at 119–20.
166 Id. at 121.
167 Id.; see also Roland Sturm, How Expensive Is Unlimited Mental Health Care Coverage
Under Managed Care?, 278 JAMA 1533, 1533 (1997).
Concerns about costs have stifled many health system reform proposals. However,
policy decisions were often based on incorrect assumptions and outdated data that
led to dramatic overestimates. For mental health care, the cost consequences of im-
proved coverage under managed care, which by now accounts for most private insur-
ance, are relatively minor.
Id.
168 See DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., EVALUATION OF PARITY IN THE FEDERAL EM-
PLOYEES HEALTH BENEFITS (FEHB) PROGRAM: FINAL REPORT 10 (2004) [hereinafter FEHB
FINAL REPORT].
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ance with a parity order issued by President Clinton in July 1999.169 The
parity order required equality between the rates, terms, and conditions (in-
cluding deductibles, copayments, inpatient day limitations, and outpatient
visit limitations) that applied to the FEHB Program’s medical and surgical
benefits and those that applied to mental health and substance use disorder
benefits.170 At the time of its issuance, one concern associated with the parity
order was that the FEHB Program would incur large increases in both
mental health service use and federal spending on mental health services.171
The federal Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”) thus com-
missioned a study to evaluate the effect of the parity order in the FEHB
Program on costs as well as other important indicators.172 The authors of the
commissioned study concluded that the cost concerns were unfounded:
“When coupled with management of care, implementation of parity in insur-
ance benefits for behavioral health care can improve insurance protection
without increasing total costs.”173 The study authors explained that their
findings reflected little or no effect of mental health parity implementation
on mental health services use and total spending.174
The FEHB Program is not alone in its mental health parity implementa-
tion cost experiences. Reports indicate that states with mental health parity
legislation have had similar experiences. By several reports, California,
Maine, Maryland, Minnesota, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island,
South Carolina, and Vermont implemented mental health parity and subse-
quently experienced either lower costs or extremely modest cost increases
(e.g., nineteen cents per member per month) in the first year of implementa-
tion.175 Additional studies report that Maryland and North Carolina exper-
169 Id. at 1; Howard H. Goldman et al., Behavioral Health Insurance Parity for Federal
Employees, 354 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1378, 1379 (2006).
170 FEHB FINAL REPORT, supra note 168, at 1. R
171 Interim Final Rules Under the Paul Wellstone and Pete Domenici Mental Health Parity
and Addiction Equity Act of 2008, 75 Fed. Reg. 5410, 5424 (Feb. 2, 2010).
172 See DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., ASSISTANT SEC’Y PLANNING & EVALUATION,
GROWTH IN PREMIUMS IN THE FEHBP FROM MENTAL HEALTH PARITY, (May 20, 2005), avail-
able at http://aspe.hhs.gov/health/reports/05/mhsamemo.htm; FEHB FINAL REPORT, supra
note 168, at 3 (identifying as key research questions: “[d]id FEHB plans incur additional R
expenses in implementing the parity policy?” and “[h]ow did the parity policy affect cost of
[mental health and substance abuse] care to the beneficiary and [the Office of Personnel
Management]?”).
173 Goldman et al., supra note 169, at 1378, 1386. R
174 Id. at 1385.
175 See Interim Final Rules Under the Paul Wellstone and Pete Domenici Mental Health
Parity and Addiction Equity Act of 2008, 75 Fed. Reg. 5410, 5425 (Feb. 2, 2010) (summariz-
ing state experiences); MENTAL HEALTH ASS’N OF GREATER ST. LOUIS, WHY MENTAL HEALTH
PARITY MAKES SENSE 1 (2004), available at http://www.mocmhc.org/documents/MHA%20
Parity%20Brief.pdf (“In Minnesota, Blue Cross/Blue Shield reduced its insurance premiums
by five to six percent after one year’s experience under the state’s comprehensive parity
law. . . . In North Carolina, mental health expenses have decreased every year since compre-
hensive parity for state and local employees was passed in 1992. Mental health costs, as a
percentage of total health benefits, have decreased from 6.4 percent in 1992 to 3.1 percent in
1998. . . . Cost analyses of the parity law in Vermont, the most comprehensive parity law in the
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ienced decreased costs following the implementation of mental health parity
when such parity coincided with the introduction of managed behavioral
health care.176
In summary, health insurers have offered a number of different reasons
for their disparate physical and mental health insurance benefits, including
the argument that mental health parity will cause insurers’ costs to rise.
However, the current health plan literature shows that untreated mental ill-
ness is associated with increases in total health care costs and that treatment
of mental illness is associated with decreases in total health care costs. In
addition, the current mental health economics literature shows that managed
behavioral health care significantly reduces—if not eliminates—the problem
of moral hazard in the context of mental health care. Finally, recent studies
of cost data obtained from health care delivery settings in which mental
health parity has been implemented show that mental health parity imple-
mentation has at most negligibly increased total health care delivery costs in
those settings.177 The current literature thus does not support insurers’ refusal
to implement mental health parity based on cost concerns.
III. NEGATIVE IMPLICATIONS OF UNTREATED MENTAL ILLNESS
A. Private and Social Costs
Health plans that are exempt from mental health parity law and
mandatory mental health and substance use disorder benefits may continue
to impose mental health benefit restrictions in an attempt to control per-
ceived moral hazard and adverse selection concerns without recognizing
other implications of untreated mental illness, including decreased rates of
work productivity as well as increased rates of disability, homelessness, wel-
fare, and crime.178
country, found that for one major health plan, costs increased by 19 cents per member per
month, and actually decreased by 9 percent for the other major health plan in the state.”).
176 Interim Final Rules Under the Paul Wellstone and Pete Domenici Mental Health Parity
and Addiction Equity Act of 2008, 75 Fed. Reg. 5410, 5424 (Feb. 2, 2010) (summarizing state
experiences).
177 See, e.g., SURGEON GENERAL REPORT, supra note 9, at 428–29; Feldman et al., supra R
note 74, at 216. R
178 See, e.g., DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL HEALTH
SERVS. ADMIN., DESIGNING EMPLOYER-SPONSORED MENTAL HEALTH BENEFITS 15 (2006)
[hereinafter DESIGNING MENTAL HEALTH BENEFITS] (“[T]here are also business costs of un-
treated mental illness, as evidenced by increased absenteeism, presenteeism, diminished pro-
ductivity, and increased disability claims costs.”); Kaplan, supra note 29, at 331–33 R
(examining the high rates of absenteeism, lost productivity, unemployment, disability, crime,
and homelessness associated with untreated mental illness); National Alliance on Mental Ill-
ness, What is Mental Illness: Mental Illness Facts, NAMI.ORG, http://www.nami.org/template.
cfm?section=about_mental_illness (“Without treatment the consequences of mental illness for
the individual and society are staggering: unnecessary disability, unemployment, substance
abuse, homelessness, inappropriate incarceration, suicide and wasted lives . . . . ”).
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Estimates of lost work productivity associated with mental illness vary
greatly, although many studies show a significant association between
mental illness and lost productivity.179 Researchers have shown that U.S. em-
ployers incur anywhere from $20 billion to $40 billion per year in lost pro-
ductivity due to employees’ mental illness.180 A number of studies also show
that both absenteeism and presenteeism181 are greater among workers with
mental illness than among workers without mental illness.182 For example,
one representative study published in 2004 by the American Psychological
Association showed that workers with depression are three times more likely
to be absent from work than workers without depression.183 A second repre-
sentative study published in 2004 by researchers affiliated with Harvard
Medical School investigated the effects of major depression on presentee-
ism, including moment-in-time work performance decreases.184 The Harvard
researchers studied 105 airline reservation agents and 181 telephone cus-
tomer service representatives who reported on their work performance at
five random moments in time throughout the day over seven consecutive
days.185 The researchers found that seven conditions, including allergies, ar-
thritis, back pain, headaches, high blood pressure, asthma, and major depres-
sion occurred in the group of subjects being studied; however, major
depression was the only condition that was significantly related to decre-
ments in both task focus and productivity.186 The researchers found that the
effect of depression on task focus and productivity was equivalent to approx-
imately 2.3 days of absenteeism per depressed worker per month and that, if
assigned a dollar amount, the workers’ losses in productivity exceeded $300
per month per employee.187 The researchers concluded that previous studies
179 See DESIGNING MENTAL HEALTH BENEFITS, supra note 178, at 16; see also Walter F. R
Stewart et al., Cost of Lost Productive Work Time Among U.S. Workers with Depression, 289
JAMA 3135, 3135 (2003) (“Evidence consistently indicates that depression has adversely af-
fected work productivity.”).
180 DESIGNING MENTAL HEALTH BENEFITS, supra note 178, at 16. Employers in other R
countries also have reported lost productivity associated with mental illness. See, e.g.,
Chunling Lu, Richard G. Frank, Yuanli Liu & Jian Shen, The Impact of Mental Health on
Labour Market Outcomes in China, 12 J. MENTAL HEALTH POLICY & ECON. 157, 157, 163
(2009) (reporting that poor mental health status is disruptive of labour market activities in
China).
181 Presenteeism refers to a situation in which an employee is physically present on the job
but has decreased productivity due to emotional difficulties. See, e.g., DESIGNING MENTAL
HEALTH BENEFITS, supra note 178, at 16; Mark Moran, Depressed Workers on the Job Hurt R
the Bottom Line, PSYCHIATRIC NEWS, Nov. 5, 2004, at 5, 5.
182 DESIGNING MENTAL HEALTH BENEFITS, supra note 178, at 16–17. R
183 Id. at 17.
184 Philip S. Wang et al., Effects of Major Depression on Moment-in-Time Work Perform-
ance, 161 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1885, 1885–91 (2004).
185 Id. at 1886.
186 Id. at 1886–87.
187 On a base of 225 workdays each year (i.e., a typical 250-day work year minus
approximately 25 days of absence for sickness per year among depressed workers
with episodes that persist the entire year), this is equivalent to somewhat more than 2
days of lost productivity per month of being depressed (225/[8×12]=2.3). . . . Even
with the relatively low salaries of the service workers in this study, the combined
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based on days missed from work significantly underestimated the adverse
economic effects associated with depression188 and that productivity losses
related to depression appear to exceed the costs of effective treatment.189
Similarly, HHS reviewed literature on the financial impact of mental disor-
ders in the workplace and concluded that employers’ productivity-related
costs associated with untreated mental illnesses are significantly greater than
employers’ cost of providing insurance coverage for such mental illnesses.190
Additional studies show that treatment of employees’ mental illnesses result-
ing in normalization of symptoms is associated with returns in productivity
that approach the productivity of employees who have no history of mental
illness.191
Several groups of researchers also have investigated the association be-
tween diagnosis of mental illness and increased disability claims.192 In one
illustrative study, researchers affiliated with Harvard Medical School ana-
lyzed data from two national surveys to estimate the short-term work disabil-
ity associated with thirty days of major depression.193 The researchers found
that workers with depression had between 1.5 and 3.2 more short-term work-
disability days in a thirty-day period than workers without depression, and
that workers with depression averaged salary-equivalent productivity losses
between $182 and $395 per worker per month.194 The researchers also found
that the workplace costs associated with major depression could be nearly as
large as the direct costs of successful depression treatment, suggesting again
that covering mental health treatments might be cost-effective for some
employers.195
Other groups of researchers also have reported a significant association
between untreated mental illness and homelessness as well as welfare re-
ceipt. Several studies have reported that homeless mothers, for example,
salary-equivalent effect of major depression on absenteeism and lost productivity is
greater than $300 per month.
Id. at 1888.
188 Id. (“Consequently, the estimate of lost productivity related to depression on days at
work (2.3 days per month) is considerably greater than the lost productivity found in previous
studies from sickness absence (approximately 1 day per month).”).
189 Id. at 1885; see also Stewart et al., supra note 179, at 3135 (“The combined LPT [lost R
productive time] burden among those with depression and the low level of treatment suggests
that there may be cost-effective opportunities for improving depression-related outcomes in
the US workforce.”).
190 DESIGNING MENTAL HEALTH BENEFITS, supra note 178, at 16–17. R
191 Michael F. Hilton et al., The Association Between Mental Disorders and Productivity
in Treated and Untreated Employees, 51 J. OCCUPATIONAL ENVTL. MED. 996, 996, 1002
(2009).
192 DESIGNING MENTAL HEALTH BENEFITS, supra note 178, at 17–18. R
193 Ronald C. Kessler et al., Depression in the Workplace: Effects on Short-Term Disabil-
ity, HEALTH AFF., Sept. 1999, at 163, 163–71.
194 Id. at 163, 166–67.
195 Id. at 163, 168 (“Our calculations of the thirty-day salary-equivalent work disability
associated with thirty-day major depression suggest that between 45 percent ($182/$402) and
98 percent ($395/$402) of this treatment cost would be offset by increased work productivity
associated with symptom remission.”).
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have higher rates of major depression and substance use disorders than
mothers in the general population.196 Some studies also have reported that
individuals who receive welfare have higher rates of mental illness than indi-
viduals in the general population. For example, researchers affiliated with
Harvard Medical School and Harvard School of Public Health assessed 216
single mothers receiving Aid to Families with Dependent Children
(“AFDC”) in Worcester, Massachusetts, and found a lifetime prevalence of
major depressive disorder among the women receiving AFDC (42.8%) that
was twice the lifetime prevalence of major depressive disorder in the general
population (20.0%).197 The Harvard researchers also found that the lifetime
prevalence of posttraumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”) was three times higher
in women receiving AFDC (34.1%) than women in the general population.198
In a second study designed to determine the prevalence, correlates, and like-
lihood of treatment for mental and substance use disorders in a population of
urban single mothers receiving Temporary Assistance for Needy Families
(“TANF”), researchers affiliated with the University of Illinois at Chicago
studied 333 TANF recipients nearing the end of their eligibility for cash
benefits.199 The Chicago researchers found that the twelve-month prevalence
of major depression in the TANF population (17.4%) was more than twice as
high as that found among women in the general population (8.6%); that the
prevalence of anxiety disorders in the TANF population (39.0%) was 60%
higher than the prevalence of anxiety in the general population (23.4%); that
the prevalence of drug use and dependence in the TANF population (5.4%)
was five times higher than the prevalence of drug use and dependence in the
general population (.7%); and that the prevalence of alcohol abuse and de-
pendence in the TANF population (5.1%) was three times higher than the
prevalence of alcohol abuse and dependence in the general population
(1.8%).200
Several groups of researchers also have reported significant associa-
tions between untreated mental illness and increased rates of criminal activ-
ity as well as between the treatment of mental illness and lower rates of
recidivism. As part of an annual Canadian Population Health Initiative, the
Canadian Institute for Health Information recently reported a higher preva-
lence of mental illness among incarcerated individuals than among the gen-
196 See, e.g., Ellen L. Bassuk et al., Prevalence of Mental Health and Substance Use Dis-
orders Among Homeless and Low-Income Housed Mothers, 155 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1561,
1561 (1998) (reporting a number of studies showing a relationship between mental illness and
homelessness).
197 Id. at 1563.
198 Id. at 1562–63.
199 Judith A. Cook et al., Prevalence of Psychiatric and Substance Use Disorders Among
Single Mothers Nearing Lifetime Welfare Eligibility Limits, 66 ARCH. GEN. PSYCHIATRY 249,
249–58 (2009).
200 Id. at 252, 254.
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eral population.201 The University of Texas Mental Health Policy
Collaborative also recently found that adolescents with mental illness are
several times more likely than adolescents without mental illness to be in-
volved with the juvenile justice system.202 Importantly, researchers who have
compared mental health treatment records to criminal justice records and
probation data have found that mental health treatment is associated with
better outcomes for criminal offenders, including lower rates of recidi-
vism.203 Juvenile offenders who received timely and adequate mental health
treatment, for example, have been found to have a lower number and lower
severity of subsequent criminal charges.204
In summary, untreated mental illness is associated with decreased rates
of work productivity as well as increased rates of disability, homelessness,
welfare, and crime. Although the studies discussed above do not show that
mental illness causes these problems, the studies do suggest the possibility
of significant returns on initial mental health treatment investments from
employer and public health and social service programs.
B. Judicial Difficulty in Distinguishing Physical and Mental Illness
Given the disparate insurance benefits associated with physical and
mental illness in both the public health care program and private health plan
settings, many courts have been asked to decide whether a particular in-
sured’s illness is physical or mental.205 The courts have had great difficulty
making these classifications, which can lead to inconsistent administration
and perverse incentives for patients. The courts have responded by creating a
number of common law tests that are designed to distinguish physical and
mental illness, including tests that focus on the area of specialization of the
treating health care provider, the nature and type of treatment provided to the
patient, the origin of the patient’s illness, and the patient’s symptoms.206 Else-
where, scholars have reviewed these tests to show how claimants may use
advances in structural and functional neuroimaging to push the boundaries
of these tests.207 A thorough review of these tests shows that not one pro-
201 CANADIAN INST. FOR HEALTH INFO., IMPROVING THE HEALTH OF CANADIANS 2008:
MENTAL HEALTH, DELINQUENCY, AND CRIMINAL ACTIVITY 29 (2008).
202 UNIV. OF TEXAS MENTAL HEALTH POL’Y ANALYSIS COLLABORATIVE, THE CONSE-
QUENCES OF UNTREATED MENTAL ILLNESS IN HOUSTON 24 (Sept. 2009) [hereinafter UN-
TREATED MENTAL ILLNESS].
203 Id. at 24–25.
204 Id.
205 See, e.g., Stacey A. Tovino, Neuroscience and Health Law: An Integrative Approach?,
42 AKRON L. REV. 469, 478–84 (2009) [hereinafter Tovino, Neuroscience] (summarizing
litigation).
206 See id. (summarizing different common law tests); Tovino, Scientific Understandings,
supra note 1, at 163–67. R
207 See Tovino, Neuroscience, supra note 205, at 478–84; Tovino, Scientific Understand- R
ings, supra note 1, at 163–67. R
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vides a rational or consistent method of distinguishing physical and mental
illness.
The first test focuses on the area of specialization of the treating health
care provider. According to this test, a patient who receives treatment from a
psychiatrist, psychologist, social worker, or mental health counselor has a
mental illness, whereas a patient who receives treatment from a non-psychia-
trist physician or other allied health professional has a physical illness.208
One problem with the provider test is that approximately one-half of all
mental health care delivered in the United States is delivered solely by gen-
eral practitioners, primary care physicians, obstetricians-gynecologists, and
other physicians who have no specialized training in psychiatry or mental
health.209 Indeed, psychiatrists now prescribe only one-third of all psycho-
tropic medications in the United States, with primary care physicians and
other medical specialists prescribing the remaining two-thirds.210 In addition,
some studies report that psychiatric patients see primary care physicians and
other non-psychiatrist medical specialists for their psychiatric problems be-
cause of their health plans’ mental health benefit disparities, including the
higher cost-sharing that may apply to outpatient visits with mental health
care providers.211 Individuals with mental illness thus are encouraged by
their insurers to seek care from professionals who may have little or no train-
ing in providing mental health care.
An application of the provider test can lead to inconsistent results. For
example, the test can lead to the classification of an individual with major
depression and suicidal thoughts who sees a psychiatrist as an individual
with a mental illness, but the classification of a second individual with the
same depression and suicidal ideation who sees a primary care physician or
an emergency room physician (perhaps due to an HMO-imposed constraint
relating to referrals to specialists) as an individual with a physical illness.212
The two patients have the same diagnosis and the same presenting symp-
toms, but one may be classified as physically ill and the other may be classi-
fied as mentally ill due to differences in their access to primary care and
specialty care providers.
A second test focuses on the nature of the treatment provided to the
patient. According to this test, a patient has a mental illness if the patient
208 See, e.g., Blake v. UnionMutual Stock Life Ins. Col., No. 87-0543-CIV, 1989 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 16331, at *12 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 10, 1989) (explaining that the patient’s postpartum
depression was properly considered a mental illness because “she was treated primarily by
psychiatrists . . . ”).
209 See Tovino, Scientific Understandings, supra note 1, at 166–67 (criticizing the provider R
test); see also Interim Final Rules Under the Paul Wellstone and Pete Domenici Mental Health
Parity and Addiction Equity Act of 2008, 75 Fed. Reg. 5410, 5423 (Feb. 2, 2010) (“Currently,
approximately half of mental health care is delivered solely by primary care physicians.”).
210 See, e.g., Barry et al., Still Unequal, supra note 27, at 134. R
211 Interim Final Rules Under the Paul Wellstone and Pete Domenici Mental Health Parity
and Addiction Equity Act of 2008, 75 Fed. Reg. 5410, 5423 (Feb. 2, 2010).
212 See Tovino, Scientific Understandings, supra note 1, at 166–67 (criticizing the provider R
test).
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receives traditional mental health treatments such as individual or group
mental health counseling, psychoanalysis, electroshock therapy, or psycho-
tropic medication.213 A patient has a physical illness, on the other hand, if the
patient receives medical and surgical treatments such as intravenous fluid
administration, artificial nutrition, chemotherapy, radiation, or open-heart
surgery.214 The treatment test focuses solely on the nature and type of treat-
ments provided to the patient, not whether the treatments are required due to
a diagnosis that may typically be classified as physical or mental. In Simons
v. Blue Cross, for example, an insured father sued his insurance company
after it denied coverage for additional inpatient days for his dependent teen-
age daughter, Amy, who had a diagnosis of anorexia nervosa.215 Even though
anorexia nervosa traditionally has been classified as a mental illness, the
court held that Amy’s treatments, which included hospitalization for treat-
ment of malnutrition, naso-gastric tube feedings, intravenous fluid adminis-
tration, and a neurological consultation and evaluation, were physical
treatments and that Amy was entitled to comprehensive insurance coverage
of those treatments.216
The treatment test can also lead to illogical or inconsistent results be-
cause it incentivizes waiting until a mental illness becomes a physical prob-
lem rather than encouraging early diagnosis and treatment of the mental
illness. For example, an individual with major depression who requires
stomach-pumping following a drug overdose, or stitches for sliced wrists
following a suicide attempt, will be classified as an individual with a physi-
cal illness, whereas an individual with major depression and suicidal idea-
tion who seeks counseling in an attempt to prevent a drug overdose or
suicide attempt will be classified as an individual with a mental illness.217
A third test focuses on the origin of the patient’s illness. According to
this test, a patient has a physical illness if the patient’s illness has an organic,
or biological, basis.218 One legal problem with this test is that many illnesses
traditionally classified as mental, including schizophrenia, bipolar disorder,
major depressive disorder, and obsessive-compulsive disorder, already have
213 See, e.g., Simons v. Blue Cross, 536 N.Y.S.2d 431, 434 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989) (“The
plain, ordinary meaning of ‘psychiatric’ care is the sort of treatment, such as electroshock
therapy and psychotropic medication, rendered to a patient who has been admitted to a psychi-
atric ward in order to attend to his or psychiatric disorder.”).
214 Id. at 434–35.
215 Id. at 432.
216 Id. at 434.
217 See, e.g., id. at 434–35 (“An attempted suicide, for instance, may have profound psy-
chiatric problems warranting psychotherapy or other psychiatric care but the patient must still
be medically treated for the self-inflicted drug overdose or gunshot wound endangering his or
her life.”). See generally Tovino, Scientific Understandings, supra note 1, at 165–66 (criticiz- R
ing the treatment test).
218 See, e.g., Arkansas Blue Cross v. Doe, 733 S.W.2d 429, 431–32 (Ark. Ct. App. 1987)
(deferring to the lower court’s finding that bipolar affective disorder has a biological basis).
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been found by state legislatures to have a biological basis,219 and these legis-
lative findings may be inconsistent with an insurer’s view regarding the ill-
nesses that constitute mental illnesses. Moreover, it is possible that attorneys
representing insureds could reference almost any neuroimaging study report-
ing a structural or functional correlate of a mental illness and try to convince
a lay judge that the insured’s illness has a biological basis.220 For example, in
Arkansas Blue Cross v. Doe, an insured father called four psychiatrists and
two clinical psychologists to testify that his daughter’s bipolar disorder had a
biological basis.221 The experts convinced the court that the current scientific
evidence overwhelmingly showed that bipolar disorder has physical and bio-
logical causes.222 The court ultimately agreed that the daughter’s bipolar dis-
order was a physical illness, not a mental illness.223
The biological basis test is also not ideal because many health condi-
tions have a multifactorial etiology that precludes biology from serving as a
singular, distinguishing feature.224 Some cancers, at least in theory, have a
purely biological basis, while others, such as lung cancer, may have been
caused or reinforced by smoking or proximity to second-hand smoke. Fi-
nally, the test’s emphasis on biology could create confusion and inconsis-
tency because insurance companies do not apply a similar biology threshold
to physical injuries when determining coverage. If one child pushes another
child on the playground and the second child breaks her arm, or if an adult
driver suffers whiplash as a result of a motor vehicle accident caused by a
second driver who is texting while driving, there is no biological basis for
the broken arm or the whiplash injury. The cause in both cases may be clas-
sified as social or environmental. Yet, no insurance company would deny
219 See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 175, § 47B(a) (2010) (classifying the following ill-
nesses as biologically-based mental illnesses: schizophrenia, schizoaffective disorder, major
depressive disorder, bipolar disorder, paranoia and other psychotic disorders, obsessive-com-
pulsive disorder, panic disorder, delirium and dementia, affective disorders, eating disorders,
post-traumatic stress disorder, substance abuse disorders, and autism); NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 689A.0455(8) (2010) (classifying the following illnesses as biologically-based mental ill-
nesses: schizophrenia, schizoaffective disorder, bipolar disorder, major depressive disorders,
panic disorder, and obsessive-compulsive disorder).
220 See, e.g., Tovino, Neuroscience, supra note 205, at app. 510–17 (summarizing recent R
neuroscientific investigations of common mental illnesses that identify structural and func-
tional correlates of these illnesses).
221 Arkansas Blue Cross, 733 S.W.2d at 431.
222 Id. (quoting Dr. Thomas Harris, the son’s treating psychiatrist, as stating that, “The
medical research is now, in my opinion, overwhelming in that regard. . . . This illness . . .
manifests some behavioral or emotional disturbances, but the causes of those manifestations
are physical and biological in nature.”).
223 Id. at 432.
224 See Tovino, Scientific Understandings, supra note 1, at 101, 121 (outlining a mul- R
tifactorial model for postpartum illness that gives weight to hormonal, genetic, evolutionary,
psychosocial, sociocultural, and other biological and environmental factors).
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treatment for the child’s broken arm or the adult’s whiplash injury due to a
lack of basis in biology.225
A final test focuses on the patient’s symptoms. According to this test, a
patient has a mental illness if the patient’s symptoms are behavioral, such as
mood swings, delusions, hallucinations, aberrant behavior, or lying.226
Courts that follow this test reason that most laymen classify illnesses based
on their symptoms, not whether the illness has a basis in biology.227 The
problem with the symptom test is that it does not always lead to the most
consistent, rational results either. The first readily-observable symptoms of a
severe eating disorder may be malnutrition and dehydration, thus leading to
classification of a particular individual’s eating disorder as a physical illness,
although the public typically views eating disorders as mental illnesses.
Likewise, the first symptoms of an individual who has Alzheimer’s disease,
Parkinson’s disease, or has suffered a stroke may be aberrant behavior or
aberrant movements, although Alzheimer’s disease, Parkinson’s disease,
stroke, and other neurological conditions frequently are classified as physi-
cal illnesses, not mental illnesses.
In summary, courts have attempted to distinguish physical and mental
illnesses based on a number of different tests that inquire into the area of
specialization of the treating health care provider, the nature and type of
treatment, the origin of the illness, and the symptoms of the illness. Not one
of these tests provides a rational, consistent method of distinguishing physi-
cal and mental illness. Public health programs and private health plans
should not be permitted to tie health insurance benefits to artificial distinc-
tions such as these.
IV. THE INCOMPLETE DEVELOPMENT OF FEDERAL MENTAL
HEALTH PARITY LAW
A. The Mental Health Parity Act of 1996
The federal government took its first step towards establishing mental
health parity on September 26, 1996, when President Bill Clinton signed the
225 See, e.g., Barry, Political Evolution, supra note 9, at 189 (reporting Congressional tes- R
timony that biological origin is not the only important factor in determining whether a health
insurance company should cover a particular health condition).
226 See, e.g., Brewer v. Lincoln Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 921 F.2d 150, 154 (8th Cir. 1990)
(“Robert C. Brewer’s disease manifested itself in terms of mood swings and aberrant behavior.
Regardless of the cause of his disorder, it is abundantly clear that he suffered from what
laypersons would consider to be a ‘mental illness.’ Consequently, Lincoln National properly
limited its coverage under both policies.”); Equitable Life Assurance Soc’y v. Berry, 212 Cal.
App. 3d 832, 839–40 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (classifying an individual’s manic-depressive illness
as a mental illness characterized by the individual’s changing moods, delusions, and
hallucinations).
227 See, e.g., Brewer, 921 F.2d at 154.
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Mental Health Parity Act (“MHPA”) into law.228 As discussed in more detail
below, MHPA regulates the lifetime and annual spending limits that covered
group health plans may apply to mental health benefits if such plans already
offer both physical health and mental health benefits.229 As originally en-
acted, MHPA only regulated insured and self-insured group health plans of
non-small employers, defined as those employers that employ an average of
51 or more employees.230 MHPA thus did not apply to the group health plans
of small employers,231 individual health plans, the Medicare Program, Medi-
caid non-managed care plans, or any self-funded, non-federal governmental
plan whose sponsor opted out of MHPA.232 Finally, MHPA contained an “in-
creased cost” exemption for covered group health plans or health insurance
coverage offered in connection with such plans if the application of MHPA
resulted in an increase in the cost under the plan of at least one percent.233 By
November 1998, over two years following MHPA’s enactment, only four
plans across the United States had obtained exemptions due to cost increases
of one percent or more.234
In terms of its substantive provisions, MHPA was neither a mandated
offer nor a mandated benefit law; that is, nothing in MHPA required a cov-
ered group health plan to actually offer or provide any mental health bene-
fits.235 As originally enacted, MHPA also was not a comprehensive parity
228 See MHPA, Pub. L. No. 104-204, secs. 701–03, 110 Stat. 2944 (codified as amended at
29 U.S.C. § 1185a (2006 & Supp. IV 2010) and 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-26 (2006 & Supp. IV
2010)).
229 See id. sec. 702, § 712(a)(1), (2).
230 See id. sec. 702, § 712(a)(1), (2) (applying in each case to “a group health plan (or
health insurance coverage offered in connection with such a plan . . .)”).
231 See id. sec. 702, § 712(c)(1)(A), (B) (exempting from MHPA application group health
plans of small employers; defining small employers as those who employed an average of at
least two but not more than fifty employees on business days during the preceding calendar
year and who employ at least two employees on the first day of the plan year).
232 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-21(a)(2)(A) (2006 & Supp. IV 2010) (permitting sponsors
of individual or group health plans to opt out of particular federal requirements); 45 C.F.R.
§ 146.180(a)(1)(v) (2009) (permitting sponsors of non-federal governmental health plans to
opt out of certain federal mental health parity requirements); Barry et al., Political History,
supra note 154, at 407 (explaining that MHPAEA does not apply to Medicaid non-managed R
care plans); Memorandum from Steve Larsen, Dir. Oversight, Dep’t Health & Human Servs., 2
(Sept. 21, 2010) [hereinafter Larsen Memo] (discussing the ability of non-federal governmen-
tal plans to opt out of federal mental health parity law and the survival of such ability post-
ACA: “Provisions subject to opt-out for plan years beginning on or after 9/23/10 [include] . . .
parity in the application of certain limits to mental health benefits (including requirements of
the Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act)”); Letter from Cindy Mann, Dep’t Health
& Human Servs., Ctrs. Medicare & Medicaid Servs., to State Health Officials, 2 (Nov. 4,
2009) (“The MHPAEA requirements apply to Medicaid only insofar as a State’s Medicaid
agency contracts with one or more managed care organizations (MCOs) or Prepaid Inpatient
Health Plans (PIHPs), to provide medical/surgical benefits as well as mental health or sub-
stance use disorder benefits. . . . MHPAEA parity requirements do not apply to the Medicaid
State plan if a State does not use MCOs or PIHPs to provide these benefits.”).
233 MHPA sec. 702, § 712(c)(2).
234 Barry, Political Evolution, supra note 9, at 187. R
235 See MHPA sec. 702, § 712(b)(1).
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLL\49-1\HLL101.txt unknown Seq: 37 11-JAN-12 9:23
2012] All Illnesses Are (Not) Created Equal 37
law because it neither protected individuals with substance use disorders236
nor required parity between physical and mental health benefits in terms of
deductibles, copayments, coinsurance, inpatient day limitations, or outpa-
tient visit limitations.237
As originally enacted, MHPA regulates the lifetime and annual spend-
ing limits that covered group health plans may apply to mental health bene-
fits if such plans already offer both physical health and mental health
benefits.238 More specifically, if a covered group health plan does not impose
an aggregate lifetime or annual limit on substantially all physical health ben-
efits, the plan may not impose an aggregate lifetime or annual limit on of-
fered mental health benefits.239 If a covered group health plan does impose
an aggregate lifetime or annual limit on substantially all physical health ben-
efits, the plan shall either apply the applicable limit to both physical health
and mental health benefits and not distinguish in the application of such
limit between the two benefit sets, or, the plan shall not impose any aggre-
gate lifetime or annual limit on mental health benefits that is less than the
applicable lifetime or annual limit imposed on physical health benefits.240
MHPA thus would prohibit a covered group health plan from imposing a
$20,000 annual cap or a $100,000 lifetime cap on mental health care if the
plan had no annual or lifetime caps for physical health care or if the plan had
higher caps, such as a $50,000 annual cap or a $500,000 lifetime cap, for
physical health care.
B. The Paul Wellstone and Pete Domenici Mental Health Parity and
Addiction Equity Act of 2008
Twelve years after President Clinton signed MHPA into law, President
George W. Bush expanded federal mental health parity law by signing into
law the Paul Wellstone and Pete Domenici Mental Health Parity and Addic-
tion Equity Act of 2008 (“MHPAEA”).241 As discussed in more detail be-
low, MHPAEA built on MHPA by imposing comprehensive parity
236 See id. sec. 702, § 712(e)(4) (“The term ‘mental health benefits’ means benefits with
respect to mental health services, as defined under the terms of the plan or coverage (as the
case may be), but does not include benefits with respect to treatment of substance abuse or
chemical dependency.”).
237 See id. sec. 702, § 712(b)(2) (“Nothing in this Section shall be construed . . . as affect-
ing the terms and conditions (including cost sharing, limits on numbers of visits or days of
coverage, and requirements relating to medical necessity) relating to the amount, duration, or
scope of mental health benefits under the plan or coverage . . .”).
238 See id. sec. 702, § 712(a)(1), (2).
239 See id. sec. 702, § 712(a)(1)(A) (no aggregate lifetime limits); id. sec. 702,
§ 712(a)(2)(A) (no annual limits).
240 See id. sec. 702, § 712(a)(1)(B) (aggregate lifetime limits); id. sec. 702, § 712(a)(2)(B)
(annual limits).
241 See MHPAEA, Pub. L. No. 110-343, secs. 511–12, 122 Stat. 3765, 3881–93 (codified
as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1185a (2006 & Supp. IV 2010) and 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-26 (2006 &
Supp. IV 2010)).
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requirements on covered group health plans. In particular, MHPAEA man-
dated financial requirements (including deductibles, copayments, coinsur-
ance and other out-of-pocket expenses)242 and treatment limitations
(including inpatient day and outpatient visit limitations)243 that covered
group health plans imposed on mental health and substance use disorder
benefits to be no more restrictive than the predominant financial require-
ments and treatment limitations imposed on substantially all physical health
benefits.244
As originally enacted, MHPAEA (like MHPA) only regulated insured
and self-insured group health plans of non-small employers, defined as those
employers that employ an average of fifty-one or more employees.245
MHPAEA (like MHPA) thus did not apply to small group health plans, indi-
vidual health plans, the Medicare Program, Medicaid non-managed care
plans, or any self-funded, non-federal governmental plans whose sponsor
opted out of MHPAEA.246 In terms of its substantive provisions, MHPAEA
also was neither a mandated offer nor a mandated benefit law; that is, noth-
ing in MHPAEA required a covered group health plan to actually offer or
provide any mental health benefits.247 Like MHPA, MHPAEA also contained
an “increased cost” exemption for covered group health plans and health
insurance coverage offered in connection with such plans, but under
MHPAEA the amount of the required cost increase increased, at least for the
first year.248 That is, a covered plan that could demonstrate a cost increase of
at least two percent in the first plan year and one percent in each subsequent
plan year of the actual total costs of coverage with respect to medical and
surgical benefits and mental health and substance use disorder benefits
would be eligible for an exemption from MHPAEA for such year.249
MHPAEA required that determinations of exemption-qualifying cost in-
creases be made and certified in writing by a qualified and licensed actuary
who in good standing belongs to the American Academy of Actuaries.250
242 See id. sec. 512(a)(1), § 712(a)(3)(B)(i) (including within the definition of “financial
requirements” deductibles, copayments, coinsurance, and out-of-pocket expenses).
243 See id. sec. 512(a)(1), § 712(a)(3)(B)(iii) (including within the definition of “treatment
limitations” limits on the frequency of treatment, number of visits, days of coverage, and other
similar limits on the scope or duration of treatment).
244 See id. sec. 512(a)(1), § 712(a)(3)(A) (requiring both financial requirements and treat-
ment limitations applicable to mental health and substance use disorder benefits to be no more
restrictive than the predominant financial requirements and treatment limitations applied to
substantially all physical health benefits covered by the plan).
245 Id. sec. 512(c)(3), § 9812(c)(1).
246 See supra note 232 and accompanying text. R
247 See MHPAEA sec. 512(a)(1), § 712(a)(3)(A) (regulating only those group health plans
that offer both physical health and mental health benefits).
248 See id. sec. 512(a)(3), § 712(c)(2)(A) (establishing new cost exemption provisions).
249 Id. sec. 512(a)(3), § 712(c)(2)(B).
250 Id. sec. 512(a)(3), § 712(c)(2)(C).
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Notwithstanding these limitations and exemptions, MHPAEA built on
MHPA by protecting individuals with substance use disorders251 and by im-
posing comprehensive parity requirements on covered group health plans. In
particular, MHPAEA required financial requirements (including deductibles,
copayments, coinsurance and other out-of-pocket expenses)252 and treatment
limitations (including inpatient day and outpatient visit limitations)253 that
covered group health plans imposed on mental health and substance use dis-
order benefits to be no more restrictive than the predominant financial re-
quirements and treatment limitations imposed on substantially all physical
health benefits.254 On February 2, 2010, the Departments of Treasury, Labor,
and Health and Human Services co-released an interim final rule implement-
ing MHPAEA’s requirements.255 The interim final rule clarified in favor of
patients with mental health conditions several questions that MHPA and
MHPAEA had left open, including the question whether a covered group
health plan could impose separately accumulating financial requirements or
quantitative treatment limitations on mental health and substance use disor-
der benefits256 and the question whether a covered group health plan could
impose a non-quantitative treatment limitation (including a medical neces-
sity limitation or an experimental/investigative limitation) on mental health
and substance use disorder benefits.257
C. The Affordable Care Act of 2010
Two years after President Bush signed MHPAEA into law, President
Obama further expanded mental health parity law by signing into law the
251 See id. sec. 512(a)(1), § 712(a)(3)(A) (regulating the financial requirements and treat-
ment limitations that are applied to both mental health and substance use disorder benefits); id.
sec. 512(a)(4), § 712(e)(5) (adding a new definition of “substance use disorder benefits”).
252 Id. sec. 512(a)(1), § 712(a)(3)(B)(i) (including within the definition of “financial re-
quirements” deductibles, copayments, coinsurance, and out-of-pocket expenses).
253 Id. sec. 512(a)(1), § 712(a)(3)(B)(iii) (including within the definition of “treatment
limitations” limits on the frequency of treatment, number of visits, days of coverage, and other
similar limits on the scope or duration of treatment).
254 Id. sec. 512(a)(1), § 712(a)(3)(A) (requiring both financial requirements and treatment
limitations applicable to mental health and substance use disorder benefits to be no more re-
strictive than the predominant financial requirements and treatment limitations applied to sub-
stantially all physical health benefits covered by the plan).
255 Interim Final Rules Under the Paul Wellstone and Pete Domenici Mental Health Parity
and Addiction Equity Act of 2008, 75 Fed. Reg. 5410, 5410–51 (Feb. 2, 2010).
256 See id. at 5449 (revising 45 C.F.R. § 46.136(c)(3)(v) to clarify that covered group
health plans may not apply cumulative financial requirements or cumulative quantitative treat-
ment limitations for mental health or substance use disorder benefits in a classification that
accumulates separately from any established for medical or surgical benefits in the same
classification).
257 See id. (revising 45 C.F.R. § 46.136(c)(4)(i) and (ii) to clarify that a covered group
health plan may not impose a non-quantitative treatment limitation on mental health and sub-
stance use disorder benefits unless the processes used in applying the treatment limitation are
comparable to, and are applied no more stringently than, the processes used in applying the
same limitation on medical and surgical benefits).
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health care reform bill, formally known as the Patient Protection and Afford-
able Care Act of 2010 (“PPACA”) as reconciled by the Health Care and
Education Reconciliation Act (“HCERA”) (as consolidated, the Affordable
Care Act (“ACA”)).258 Perhaps best known for its controversial (and consti-
tutionally challenged) individual health insurance mandate,259 ACA has bur-
ied deep within it several provisions that relate to mental health insurance
benefits. If upheld,260 these provisions will expand both mental health parity
law and mandatory mental health and substance use disorder benefits to ad-
ditional, but not all, groups of individuals with public and private health
insurance.
A first provision within ACA states: “Section 2726 of the Public Health
Service Act [(“PHSA”)] shall apply to qualified health plans in the same
manner and to the same extent as such section applies to health insurance
issuers and group health plans.”261 Section 2726 of the PHSA is the parallel
citation to 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-26, the section within the United States Code
where the non-ERISA provisions of MHPA as amended by MHPAEA are
codified.262 The dramatic effect of this provision is to expand the application
of MHPA and MHPAEA from just large group health plans to all qualified
health plans that are offered on one of the new ACA-created state or regional
health insurance exchanges beginning on or after January 1, 2014.263 A sec-
ond provision buried within ACA makes conforming and technical changes
to PHSA section 2726 to clarify the expansion of MHPA and MHPAEA to
individual health insurance coverage.264 As a result of these two provisions,
many health insurance plans that were previously exempt from MHPA and
MHPAEA now are prohibited from offering inferior mental health insurance
benefits, including through higher deductibles, copayments, and coinsurance
rates, as well as lower inpatient day and outpatient visit limitations.
A third provision in ACA prevents group health plans and health insur-
ance issuers offering group or individual health insurance coverage from
258 ACA, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010), as amended by Pub. L. No. 111-152,
124 Stat. 1029 (2010).
259 ACA sec. 1501(b), § 5000A(a) (“An applicable individual shall for each month begin-
ning after 2013 ensure that the individual, and any dependent of the individual who is an
applicable individual, is covered under minimum essential coverage for such month.”).
260 See supra note 64. R
261 ACA sec. 1311(j) (entitled, “Applicability of Mental Health Parity”).
262 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-26 (2006 & Supp. IV 2010) (entitled “Parity in Mental Health and
Substance Use Disorder Benefits”).
263 ACA sec. 1311(j) (“[MHPAEA] shall apply to qualified health plans in the same man-
ner and to the same extent as such section applies to health insurance issuers and group health
plans.”). Compare MHPAEA, Pub. L. No. 110-343, sec. 512(a)(1), § 712(a)(3)(A), 122 Stat.
3756, 3881 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1185a) (making its provisions applicable to “group health
plans or health insurance coverage offered in connection with such a plan”) with 42 U.S.C.
§ 300gg-26 (2006 & Supp. IV 2010) (making its provisions applicable to a “group health plan
or a health insurance issuer offering group or individual health insurance”).
264 ACA sec. 1563(c)(4) (identifying the conforming and technical changes that will be
made to former 42 U.S.C. 300gg-5 which has since been  transferred to 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-26
(2006 & Supp. IV 2010)).
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establishing any lifetime as well as certain annual limits on the dollar value
of essential health benefits for any participant or beneficiary.265 Although
ACA reserves the right of a group health plan or health insurance coverage
to impose annual and lifetime per beneficiary limits on specific covered ben-
efits that are not essential health benefits,266 mental health and substance use
disorder benefits, including behavioral health treatments, are considered es-
sential health benefits267 and thus are excepted from the right of reservation.
This third ACA provision builds on the original MHPA, which allowed life-
time and annual limits but only so long as such limits that applied to treat-
ment of mental health conditions were not lower than those that applied to
treatment of physical health conditions.268 Now, ACA prohibits all lifetime
as well as most annual limits.269
Perhaps most importantly, a final set of ACA provisions mandates
mental health and substance use disorder benefits in certain plan settings.
Under section 1201 of ACA, a health insurance issuer that offers health in-
surance coverage in the individual or small group markets shall ensure that
such coverage includes the essential health benefits package required under
section 1302 of ACA.270 Under section 1301 of ACA, qualified health plans
that will be offered on the new ACA-created health insurance exchanges also
must provide the essential health benefits package described in section 1302
of ACA.271 And, under section 2001 of ACA, Medicaid benchmark plans and
benchmark-equivalent plans also must provide the essential health benefits
265 ACA sec. 1001, as amended by sec. 10101(a), § 2711(a)(1). ACA prohibits lifetime
dollar limits on essential benefits in any grandfathered or non-grandfathered health plan or
insurance policy issued or renewed on or after September 23, 2010. ACA restricts and phases
out annual dollar limits that all grandfathered and non-grandfathered group health plans, as
well as non-grandfathered individual health insurance plans issued after March 23, 2010, can
place on essential benefits; that is, none of these plans can impose an annual dollar limit lower
than: (1) $750,000 for a plan year or policy year starting on or after September 23, 2010 but
before September 23, 2011; (2) $1.25 million for a plan year or policy year starting on or after
September 23, 2011 but before September 23, 2012; or (3) $2 million for a plan year or policy
year starting on or after September 23, 2012 but before January 1, 2014. ACA prohibits annual
limits on essential benefits beginning January 1, 2014. See id. sec. 1001, as amended by sec.
10101(a), § 2711(a)(2) (“With respect to plan years beginning prior to January 1, 2014, a
group health plan and a health insurance issuer offering group or individual health insurance
coverage may only establish a restricted annual limit on the dollar value of benefits for any
participant or beneficiary with respect to the scope of benefits that are essential health benefits
under section 1302(b) of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, as determined by the
Secretary.”); 75 Fed. Reg. 37188, 37229–30 (June 28, 2010) (adding new lifetime and annual
limit regulations at 29 C.F.R. § 2590.715-2711(a)–(d)). See generally Lifetime & Annual Lim-
its, HEALTHCARE.GOV, Sept. 23, 2010, http://www.healthcare.gov/law/features/costs/limits/in-
dex.html (explaining the new lifetime and annual limit prohibitions and restrictions).
266 ACA sec. 1001, as amended by sec. 10101(a), § 2711(b).
267 Id. sec. 1302(b)(1)(E) (including mental health and substance use disorder services,
including behavioral health treatment, within the definition of essential health benefits).
268 See supra notes 226–228 and accompanying text. R
269 See supra note 265. R
270 ACA sec. 1201, § 2707(a).
271 Id. sec. 1301(a)(1)(B).
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package described in section 1302 of ACA.272 Under the thrice-referenced
section 1302 of ACA, essential health benefits include “mental health and
substance use disorder services, including behavioral health treat-
ment[s].”273 Read together, these three provisions are quite significant. Fed-
eral law for the first time is mandating mental health and substance use
disorder benefits in certain plan settings; that is, the exchange-offered quali-
fied health plan, the non-exchange individual health plan, the non-exchange
small group health plan, the Medicaid benchmark plan, the benchmark-
equivalent plan, and the Medicaid state plan settings.274
Under regulations co-published by the Departments of Treasury, Labor,
and Health and Human Services on June 17, 2010, the Departments clarified,
however, that the essential health benefit requirement does not apply to
grandfathered health plans.275 A grandfathered health plan is a group health
plan or health insurance issuer that was in effect on March 23, 2010, the day
President Obama signed PPACA into law.276 Non-grandfathered health plans
include group health plans and health insurance issuers established after
March 23, 2010, as well as originally grandfathered health plans that subse-
quently lose grandfathered status.277 Situations that will not cause a
grandfathered plan to lose grandfathered status include: (1) the cessation of
coverage by the plan of one or more or all of the individuals enrolled in the
plan on March 23, 2010, so long as the plan has continuously covered some-
272 Id. sec. 2001(c)(3), § 1937(b)(6).
273 Id. sec. 1302(b)(1)(E) (“essential health benefits . . . shall include . . . [m]ental health
and substance use disorder services, including behavioral health treatment”); The Affordable
Care Act and Mental Health: An Update, HEALTHCARE.GOV, Aug. 19, 2010, http://www.
healthcare.gov/blog/2010/08/mentalhealthupdate.html (“[I]n 2014, mental health and sub-
stance use disorder services will be part of the essential benefits package, a set of health care
service categories that must be covered by certain plans, including all insurance policies that
will be offered through the Exchanges, and Medicaid.”).
274 See ACA sec. 1302(b)(1)(E); see also Essential Health Benefits, supra note 34 (“Insur- R
ance policies must cover these [essential health] benefits in order to be certified and offered in
Exchanges, and all Medicaid State plans must cover these services by 2014”).
275 Interim Final Rules for Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Coverage Relating to
Status as a Grandfathered Health Plan Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act,
75 Fed. Reg. 34538, 34562 (June 17, 2010) (adding new 29 C.F.R. § 2590.715–1251(a), which
defines “grandfathered health plan coverage” as “coverage provided by a group health plan,
or a health insurance issuer, in which an individual was enrolled on March 23, 2010.”); id. at
34559 (explaining that section 2707 of the Public Health Service Act does not apply to
grandfathered health plans); id. at 34563 (adding new 29 C.F.R. § 2590.715–1251(c)(1)
(“[T]he provisions of PHS Act sections . . . 2707 . . . do not apply to grandfathered health
plans.”)); DEP’T LABOR, EMP. BENEFITS SEC. ADMIN., APPLICATION OF THE NEW HEALTH RE-
FORM PROVISIONS OF PART A OF TITLE XXVII OF THE PHS ACT TO GRANDFATHERED PLANS 1
(June 17, 2010) [hereinafter DEP’T LABOR, GRANDFATHERED PLANS] (explaining that ACA’s
essential benefit package requirement is not applicable to grandfathered plans).
276 Interim Final Rules for Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Coverage Relating to
Status as a Grandfathered Health Plan Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act,
75 Fed. Reg. 34538, 34562 (June 17, 2010) (adding new 29 C.F.R. § 2590.715–1251(a), which
defines “grandfathered health plan coverage” as “coverage provided by a group health plan,
or a health insurance issuer, in which an individual was enrolled on March 23, 2010”).
277 Id. at 34541 (defining grandfathered plans and identifying the ways in which
grandfathered plans can lose grandfathered status, turning them into non-grandfathered plans).
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one since March 23, 2010; (2) the enrollment of new family members in the
plan after March 23, 2010, so long as the family members are dependents of
an individual who was enrolled in the plan on March 23, 2010; (3) the en-
rollment of newly hired employees and the enrollment of existing employees
eligible for new enrollment after March 23, 2010;278 and (4) entering into a
new policy, certificate, or contract of insurance (that is, changing insurance
carriers) after March 23, 2010.279 Activities that will cause a grandfathered
plan to lose grandfathered status include: (1) the elimination of all or sub-
stantially all benefits to diagnose or treat a particular condition; (2) any in-
crease in a percentage cost-sharing requirement; (3) certain increases in
fixed-amount cost-sharing requirements, including deductibles and out-of-
pocket limits but not copayments; (4) certain increases in fixed-amount
copayments; (5) certain decreases in contribution rates by employers and
employee organizations; and (6) certain changes in annual limits.280
Understanding the distinction between grandfathered and non-
grandfathered plans is the key to understanding the application of ACA’s
health insurance reforms, including its mandatory mental health and sub-
stance use disorder benefits provision. Grandfathered health plans are ex-
empt from the vast majority of new insurance reforms required by ACA,281
including newly added section 2707 of the Public Health Service Act, codi-
fied at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-26, which requires health insurance issuers that
278 Id. at 34562–63 (adding new 29 C.F.R. § 2590.715–1251(a)(1)(i) (cessation of cover-
age by one or more or all insureds), § 2590.715–1251(a)(4) (addition of new family members),
and § 2590.715–1251(b)(1) (addition of newly hired or newly enrolled employees)). See gen-
erally BERNADETTE FERNANDEZ, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, GRANDFATHERED
HEALTH PLANS UNDER THE PATIENT PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE CARE ACT (PPACA) 1
(Apr. 27, 2010).
Current enrollees in grandfathered health plans are allowed to re-enroll in that plan,
even if renewal occurs after date of enactment. Family members are allowed to en-
roll in the grandfathered plan, if such enrollment is permitted under the terms of the
plan in effect on the date of enactment. For grandfathered group plans, new employ-
ees (and their families) may enroll in such plans.
Id.
279 Amendment to the Interim Final Rules for Group Health Plans and Health Insurance
Coverage Relating to Status as a Grandfathered Health Plan Under the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act, 75 Fed. Reg. 70144, 70121 (Nov. 17, 2010) (amending 29 C.F.R.
§ 2950.715–1251(a)(1)(i) to state: “[S]ubject to the limitation set forth in paragraph (a)(1)(ii)
of this section, a group health plan (and any health insurance coverage offered in connection
with the group health plan) does not cease to be a grandfathered health plan merely because
the plan (or its sponsor) enters into a new policy, certificate, or contract of insurance after
March 23, 2010 (for example, a plan enters into a new contract with a new issuer or a new
policy is issued with an existing insurer).”).
280 Interim Final Rules for Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Coverage Relating to
Status as a Grandfathered Health Plan Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act,
75 Fed. Reg. 34538, 34564–65 (June 17, 2010) (adding 29 C.F.R. § 2590.715–1251(g)(1),
which lists the changes that will cause cessation of grandfathered status).
281 See, e.g., id. at 34540 (explaining that ACA provides that certain group health plans
and health insurance coverage existing as of March 23, 2010, are subject only to certain provi-
sions of ACA); FERNANDEZ, supra note 278, at 1 (“Grandfathered health plans are exempt R
from the vast majority of new insurance reforms under PPACA.”).
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offer health insurance coverage in the individual and small group markets to
ensure that such coverage includes the essential health benefits package re-
quired under section 1302(a) of ACA.282 The result (in terms of mandated
benefits) is that grandfathered health plans are regulated only by MHPA and
MHPAEA, neither of which contains a mandated mental health or substance
use disorder benefit,283 as well as state law, which may or may not contain a
mandated mental health and substance use disorder benefit.284 Grandfathered
health plans are not the only health plans that are exempt from the essential
health benefits requirement. Large group health plans not offered on a health
insurance exchange, self-insured ERISA plans, and ERISA-governed mul-
tiemployer welfare arrangements also are exempt from the essential health
benefits requirement.285
In summary, many public health care program beneficiaries and private
health plan members will not have a federal legal right to mental health
parity and/or mandatory mental health and substance use disorder benefits
even after the full implementation of health care reform. In order to expand
mental health parity and mandatory mental health and substance use disorder
benefits to all individuals with public and private health insurance, certain
federal statutory and regulatory provisions should be revised.
282 See ACA, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119, sec. 1201, § 2707(a) (2010), as amended
by Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 § 1201 (2010) (“A health insurance issuer that offers
health insurance coverage in the individual or small group market shall ensure that such cover-
age includes the essential health benefits package required under section 1302(a) of the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act.”); Interim Final Rules for Group Health Plans and Health
Insurance Coverage Relating to Status as a Grandfathered Health Plan Under the Patient Pro-
tection and Affordable Care Act, 75 Fed. Reg. 34538, 34559 (June 17, 2010) (section 2707 of
the Public Health Service Act does not apply to grandfathered health plans); id. at 34563
(adding new 29 C.F.R. § 2590.715-1251(c)(1) (“[T]he provisions of PHS Act . . . [section]
2707 . . . do not apply to grandfathered health plans.”)); DEP’T LABOR, GRANDFATHERED
PLANS, supra note 275 (ACA’s essential benefit package requirement does not apply to R
grandfathered plans).
283 See 29 U.S.C. § 1185a(b)(1) (2009) (“Nothing in this section shall be construed as
requiring a group health plan (or health insurance coverage offered in connection with such a
plan) to provide any mental health or substance use disorder benefits”); 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-
26(b)(1) (2006 & Supp. IV 2010) (“Nothing in this section shall be construed as requiring a
group health plan or a health insurance issuer offering group or individual health insurance
coverage to provide any mental health or substance use disorder benefits”).
284 See, e.g., Tovino, Reforming, supra note 2 (reviewing the patchwork of state mental R
health parity law).
285 See, e.g., Sara Rosenbaum, Joel Teitelbaum & Katherine Hayes, The Essential Health
Benefits Provisions of the Affordable Care Act: Implications for People with Disabilities, 3
COMMW. FUND 1, 3 (Mar. 24, 2011) (“The act exempts large-group health plans, as well as
self-insured ERISA plans and ERISA-governed multiemployer welfare arrangements not sub-
ject to state insurance law, from the essential benefit requirements.”).
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V. REFORMING FEDERAL MENTAL HEALTH INSURANCE LAW
A. The Medicare Program
The Medicare Program covers approximately forty-five million people,
including thirty-eight million individuals age sixty-five or older and seven
million individuals with disabilities.286 Medicare is the nation’s largest health
insurer and processes more than one billion dollars in health care claims
each year.287 Approximately twenty-seven percent of Medicare beneficiaries
have some type of mental impairment, which means that up to 12.5 million
beneficiaries could be affected by Medicare Program mental health benefit
disparities.288
As previously discussed,289 the Medicare Program provides the follow-
ing two-sentence federal regulation codified at 42 C.F.R. § 409.62, “There is
a lifetime maximum of 190 days on inpatient psychiatric hospital services
available to any beneficiary. Therefore, once an individual receives benefits
for 190 days of care in a psychiatric hospital, no further benefits of that type
are available to that individual.”290 HHS should either: (1) delete 42 C.F.R.
§ 409.62 in its entirety; or, (2) retain 42 C.F.R. § 409.62, delete the second
sentence of the regulation, and revise the first sentence of the regulation to
read: “There is no lifetime maximum on inpatient psychiatric hospital ser-
vices available to any beneficiary.”
Through a statute codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395l(c), as amended by the
Medicare Improvements for Patients and Providers Act of 2008 (“MIPPA”),
the Medicare Program imposes a 45% beneficiary coinsurance on most out-
patient mental health services, including individual, family, and group psy-
chotherapy services, instead of the 20% beneficiary coinsurance traditionally
applied to physical health outpatient services.291 Congress should revise 42
U.S.C. § 1395l(c) to phase out the disparate coinsurance amounts that apply
to outpatient mental health services by the end of 2011, rather than the cur-
286 Juliette Cubanski, Medicare 101, ALLIANCE FOR HEALTH REFORM AND THE KAISER
FAMILY FOUNDATION (Mar. 16, 2009), at 6.
287 DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., HHS: WHAT WE DO (2010); DEP’T HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVS., CTRS. MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., PREDICTIVE MODELING SOFTWARE FOR
MEDICARE FEE FOR SRV. (FFS) CLAIMS, SOLICITATION NUMBER: RFP-CMS-2010-0056 (2010)
(“The Medicare Fee-for-Service (FFS) program consists of a number of payment systems, with
a network of contractors that process over 1.2 billion claims each year, submitted by more than
1 million health care providers such as hospitals, physicians, skilled nursing facilities, hospice
facilities, home health agencies, National Council for Prescription Drug Programs (NCPDP)
claims from suppliers and labs, ambulance companies, and durable medical equipment (DME)
suppliers.”).
288 See HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION, MEDICARE & MEDICAID STATISTICS 25
(2004) [hereinafter KAISER STATISTICS].
289 See supra Part I.A.
290 See 42 C.F.R. § 409.62 (2010).
291 See 42 U.S.C. § 1395l(c) (2006 & Supp. IV 2010).
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rently imposed year of 2014.292 More specifically, Congress should: (1) de-
lete current 42 U.S.C. § 1395l(c)(1)(C), (D), and (E); and (2) revise 42
U.S.C. § 1395l(c)(1)(A) and (B) to read as follows:
(c)(1) Notwithstanding any other provision of this part, with re-
spect to expenses incurred in a calendar year in connection with
the treatment of mental, psychoneurotic, and personality disorders
of an individual who is not an inpatient of a hospital at the time
such expenses are incurred, there shall be considered as incurred
expenses for purposes of subsections (a) and (b)—
(A) for expenses incurred in 2011, only 68 3/4 percent of
such expenses; and
(B) for expenses incurred in 2012 or any subsequent calendar
year, 100 percent of such expenses.
B. The Medicaid Program
The Medicaid Program covers more than sixty million low-income
Americans, including 29.4 million children, 15.2 million adults, 8.3 million
people with disabilities, and 6.1 million seniors.293 Federal and state expendi-
tures on Medicaid exceed 300 billion dollars annually, and Medicaid is re-
sponsible for one out of every five dollars spent on health care in the United
States.294 If upheld, the health care reform bill would expand the Medicaid
Program to cover an additional 17.1 million Americans.295
Like the Medicare Program, the Medicaid Program also has limited
support for individuals who require mental health care in certain inpatient
psychiatric settings. Through a regulation codified at 42 C.F.R.
§ 435.1009(a)(2), Medicaid provides that “[Federal financial participation]
is not available in expenditures for services provided to— (2) Individuals
under age 65 who are patients in an institution for mental diseases unless
they are under age 22 and are receiving inpatient psychiatric services under
§ 440.160 of this subchapter.”296 HHS should either: (1) delete 42 C.F.R.
§ 435.1009(a)(2) in its entirety; or (2) retain 42 C.F.R. § 435.1009(a)(2) but
revise the regulation to read: “FFP is available in expenditures for services
provided to— (2) Individuals under age 65 who are patients in an institution
for mental diseases unless they are under age 22 and are receiving inpatient
psychiatric services under § 440.160 of this subchapter.”
292 Id.
293 See, e.g., Covering the Uninsured in Medicaid, FAMILIES USA 1 (2009) (providing
Medicaid statistics).
294 KAISER STATISTICS, supra note 288, at 8. R
295 See, e.g., Kaiser Family Foundation, Expanding Medicaid: Coverage for Low-Income
Adults, FOCUS ON HEALTH REFORM (Feb. 2010), at 1.
296 See 42 C.F.R. § 435.1009(a)(2) (2010).
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C. Self-Funded, Non-Federal Governmental Health Plans
Through a federal law codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-21(a) and an im-
plementing regulation codified at 45 C.F.R. § 146.180(a)(1)(v), Congress
and HHS allow sponsors of self-funded non-federal governmental health
plans to opt out of federal mental health parity.297 The regulation, the more
succinct of the two authorities, currently provides that, “A sponsor of a non-
Federal governmental plan may elect to exempt its plan, to the extent that the
plan is not provided through health insurance coverage, (that is, it is self-
funded), from any or all of the following requirements: . . . (v) Parity in the
application of certain limits to mental health benefits . . . .”298 On September
21, 2010, HHS clarified that self-funded non-federal governmental plans,
including state and local government health plans, may continue to opt out
of federal mental health parity law even post-ACA.299 As of October 7, 2010,
the sponsors of approximately 550 state and local governmental health plans
across the United States, including the health plans of the states of Alabama,
Alaska, Kentucky, Louisiana, Montana, and North Carolina, have opted out
of complying with federal mental health parity law.300 The result is that hun-
dreds of thousands of state and local government employees are subject to
inferior mental health insurance benefits.301
Congress should revise 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-21 and 45 C.F.R.
§ 146.180(a)(1)(v) to remove the ability of sponsors of self-insured non-fed-
eral governmental health plans to opt out of complying with mental health
parity law. More specifically, Congress should delete subparagraph (v) of 45
C.F.R. § 146.180(a)(1) (“Parity in the application of certain limits to mental
health benefits . . . ”). Congress should also amend 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-21 by
adding a new subparagraph at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-21(a)(2)(F) that would
provide: “The election described in subparagraph (A) shall not be available
297 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-21(a)(2)(A) (2006 & Supp. IV 2010).
Except as provided in subparagraph (D) or (E), if the plan sponsor of a nonfederal
governmental plan which is a group health plan to which the provisions of subparts 1
and 2 otherwise apply makes an election under this subparagraph (in such form and
manner as the Secretary may by regulations prescribe), then the requirements of such
subparts insofar as they apply directly to group health plans (and not merely to group
health insurance coverage) shall not apply to such governmental plans for such pe-
riod except as provided in this paragraph.
Id. See also 45 C.F.R. § 146.180(a)(1)(v) (2010).
298 45 C.F.R. § 146.180(a)(1)(v) (2010).
299 Larsen Memo, supra note 232 (discussing the ability of self-funded, non-federal gov- R
ernmental plans to opt out of federal mental health parity law and the survival of such ability
post-ACA: “Provisions subject to opt-out for plan years beginning on or after 9/23/10 [in-
clude] . . . Parity in the application of certain limits to mental health benefits (including re-
quirements of the Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act)”).
300 DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CTRS. MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., HIPAA OPT-
OUT ELECTIONS FOR SELF-FUNDED, NON-FEDERAL GOVERNMENTAL PLANS, http://cciio.cms.
gov/resources/files/hipaa_opt_outs_as_of_2011_7_29.pdf (last updated July 29, 2011).
301 See id.
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with respect to parity in the application of certain limits to mental health
benefits.”
D. Small Group Health Plans
Federal mental health parity law currently does not apply to small
group health plans. More specifically, Congress maintains small employer
exemptions at 29 U.S.C. § 1185a(c)(1) and 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-26(c)(1) that
provide that federal mental health parity law “shall not apply to any group
health plan and a health insurance issuer offering group or individual health
insurance coverage for any plan year of a small employer . . . .”302 Small
employers are defined as employers who employ an average of not more
than fifty employees.303 Congress should delete the small employer exemp-
tions codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1185a(c)(1) and 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-26(c)(1).
E. Grandfathered Health Plans and Large Group Health Plans
Under ACA, “mental health and substance use disorder services, in-
cluding behavioral health treatment[s],” must be part of the essential benefit
package offered by exchange-offered qualified health plans, non-exchange
individual health plans, non-exchange small group health plans, Medicaid
state plans, Medicaid benchmark plans, and benchmark-equivalent plans.304
As discussed above,305 grandfathered health plans, on the other hand, are not
required to offer the essential benefit package, including mental health and
substance use disorder benefits.306 The federal government estimates that ap-
proximately 133 million Americans obtain health insurance through large
302 See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 1185a(c)(1) (2006); 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-26(c)(1) (2006).
303 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-91(e)(4) (2006).
304 See ACA, Pub. L. No. 111-148, sec. 1302(b)(1)(E), 124 Stat. 119 (2010), as amended
by Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 (2010) (“essential health benefits . . . shall include . . .
[m]ental health and substance use disorder services, including behavioral health treatment”);
id. sec. 1201, § 2707(a) (“A health insurance issuer that offers health insurance coverage in
the individual or small group market shall ensure that such coverage includes the essential
health benefits package required under section 1302(a) of the Patient Protection and Afforda-
ble Care Act.”).
305 See supra notes 275–285 and accompanying text. R
306 Interim Final Rules for Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Coverage Relating to
Status as a Grandfathered Health Plan Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act,
75 Fed. Reg. 34538 (June 17, 2010) (adding new 29 C.F.R. § 2590.715-1251(a), which defines
“grandfathered health plan coverage” as “coverage provided by a group health plan, or a
health insurance issuer, in which an individual was enrolled on March 23, 2010.”); id. at
34559 (explaining that Section 2707 of the Public Health Service Act does not apply to
grandfathered health plans); id. at 34563 (adding new 29 C.F.R. § 2590.715-1251(c)(1)
(“[T]he provisions of PHS Act . . . [section] 2707 . . . do not apply to grandfathered health
plans.”)); DEP’T LABOR, GRANDFATHERED PLANS, supra note 275 (explaining that ACA’s es- R
sential benefit package requirement is not applicable to grandfathered plans).
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employers that have grandfathered group health plans,307 and the government
further estimates that most—three-quarters—of these large grandfathered
health plans will not lose their grandfathered status over the next several
years.308 The government also estimates that approximately forty-three mil-
lion Americans obtain health insurance through small employers that also
have grandfathered group health plans, but due to the frequency with which
small plans make changes to cost sharing, employer contributions, and other
plan features that could cause loss of grandfathered status, up to two-thirds
of these plans could lose their grandfathered status over the next several
years.309 Finally, the government estimates that approximately seventeen
million Americans purchase their health insurance through the individual
health insurance market, where substantial changes in coverage are, and thus
loss of grandfathered status will be, common.310
Because most (or approximately three-quarters) of large grandfathered
group health plans, some (or approximately one-third) of small
grandfathered group health plans, and a smaller number of grandfathered
individual health plans will not lose their grandfathered health status for
some time, an estimated 100-plus million Americans will remain in
grandfathered health plans that are not required to provide essential health
benefits, including mental health and substance use disorder benefits, due to
three parallel regulations implementing ACA.311 One such regulation, codi-
fied at 45 C.F.R. § 147.140(c)(1), provides in relevant part: “[T]he provi-
sions of PHS Act sections 2701, 2702, 2703, 2705, 2706, 2707, 2709[,]
2713, 2715A, 2716, 2719, and 2719A, as added or amended by the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act, do not apply to grandfathered health
plans.”312 The Departments of Treasury, Labor, and Health and Human Ser-
vices should amend their three parallel regulations313 to remove the reference
to section 2707 of the Public Health Service Act.314 The result would be that
health plans must provide essential health benefits, including mental health
and substance use disorder benefits.
307 Keeping the Health Plan You Have: The Affordable Care Act and “Grandfathered”
Health Plans, HEALTHCARE.GOV (describing the projected impact of the health care reform bill
on consumers and health plans).
308 See id.
309 Id.
310 Id.
311 See Interim Final Rules for Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Coverage Relat-
ing to Status as a Grandfathered Health Plan Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care
Act, 75 Fed. Reg. 34538, 34559 (June 17, 2010) (adopting 26 C.F.R. § 54.9815-1251T(c)(1));
id. at 34563 (adopting 29 C.F.R. § 2590.715-1251(c)(1)); id. at 34567–68 (adopting 45 C.F.R.
§ 147.140(c)(1)).
312 Id. at 34562.
313 Id. at 34559 (adopting 26 C.F.R. § 54.9815-1251T(c)(1)); id. at 34563 (adopting 29
C.F.R. § 2590.715-1251(c)(1)); id. at 34567–68 (adopting 45 C.F.R. § 147.140(c)(1)).
314 See ACA, Pub. L. No. 111-148, sec. 1201, § 2707(a), 124 Stat. 119 (2010), as amended
by Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 (2010) (“A health insurance issuer that offers health
insurance coverage in the individual or small group market shall ensure that such coverage
includes the essential health benefits package . . .”).
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Large group health plans also are exempt from the essential health ben-
efits requirement.315 Therefore, Congress should amend section 2707 of the
Public Health Service Act to include the phrase “or large group” and to
make conforming grammatical changes in order to require large group health
plans to include the essential health benefits, as follows: “A health insurance
issuer that offers health insurance coverage in the individual, small group, or
large group market shall ensure that such coverage includes the essential
health benefits package.”
F. Maintenance of Cost Exemption
Finally, federal mental health parity law contains a cost exemption that
allows group health plans as well as health insurance issuers offering group
or individual health insurance coverage to exempt themselves from compli-
ance with federal mental health parity law if the application of such law
results in an increase in the actual total costs of coverage with respect to
medical and surgical benefits and mental health and substance use disorder
benefits under the plan of two percent in the first plan year that mental
health parity law is applied and one percent in each subsequent plan year.316
The cost exemption is not mandatory; that is, a plan may elect to comply
with federal mental health parity law regardless of any increase in total
costs.317 Because it is not anticipated that mental health parity will result in
long-term cost increases,318 Congress could maintain the cost exemption in
federal mental health parity law. Should the dynamics of mental health eco-
nomics change in a way that would cause mental health parity implementa-
tion to be associated with prohibitive health plan cost increases, health plans
may opt out of mental health parity or Congress can revisit the cost exemp-
tions at a later date.
VI. CONCLUSION
Public health care programs and private health insurers have long pro-
vided less comprehensive insurance benefits to individuals with mental ill-
ness. Although early mental health benefit disparities may have been
justified by the belief that mental health care causes total health care costs to
rise and that courts could easily distinguish physical and mental illness,
these reasons are not supported in the current clinical, health care cost, and
315 See id. (requiring health insurance issuers that offer health insurance in the individual
and small group markets (but not the large group markets) to include the essential health
benefits).
316 See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 1185a(c)(2)(A), (B) (2006); 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-26(c)(2)(A), (B)
(2006 & Supp. IV 2010).
317 See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 1185a(c)(2)(A) (2006); 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-26(c)(2)(A) (2006 &
Supp. IV 2010).
318 See supra Part II.
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legal literatures. This Article has proposed to reform federal mental health
insurance law by removing remaining Medicare and Medicaid mental health
benefit disparities and by extending the application of federal mental health
parity law and mandatory mental health and substance use disorder benefit
provisions to all individuals who have public and private health insurance. In
so doing, this Article would effectively eliminate distinctions between physi-
cal and mental illness in the context of health insurance.
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